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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, Congress directed the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare to create a commission for the purpose of as-
certaining the important principles that should guide biomedical re-
search that uses human research subjects.  The report of this commis-
sion was to be published by the Secretary in the Federal Register and, 
unless the Secretary made any other proposals, it was to become law, 
a statement of what the United States government required.  This re-
port became known as the Belmont Report, and its contents are 
widely known,1 though its legal status is not as well-known or appreci-
ated. 
The world of research and science has changed dramatically 
since the Belmont Report was written.  This Article is not making a 
new claim when it says that pharmaceutical companies manipulate 
and suppress data that is generated on human research subjects in 
order to protect and expand on the industry’s profitability.  However, 
the interplay between this use of data and the requirements of the 
Belmont Report have, until now, gone unexamined. 
Last year literally millions of Americans were participants in 
medical research, with estimates ranging from 2.3 million to upwards 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.  Much of the 
initial work on this project was done while the author was a Donaghue Scholar in Re-
search Ethics at Yale University’s Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics.  The Author 
would like to express gratitude to the Donaghue Foundation, Yale University and 
Robert Levine for their support, as well as the University of Toronto Law School, and 
the Greenwall Fellowship and the University of South Carolina philosophy depart-
ment, all of whom invited the author to present this work in various forms and pro-
vided generous and helpful commentary.  Thanks are also due Ruth Faden, Madison 
Powers, and Nathan Crystal for their comments. 
 1 See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (5th ed. 2001). 
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of 10 million persons enrolled as subjects in roughly 80,000 separate 
studies.2  The pharmaceutical and medical device industry is the larg-
est consumer of human research subjects in the world3 because these 
companies must prove a minimal level of safety and efficacy of their 
products in order to receive governmental permission to market 
them, and this regulatory approval requires conducting drug trials on 
people.4  Pharmaceuticals and medical devices make up an industry 
whose annual sales are measured in the hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.5  This large industry has recently been the subject of much criti-
cism focused on the problem of undisclosed risks of harm for those 
taking its products.6  The medical and professional commentary on 
this issue has focused on the ethical implications of undisclosed risks 
to the consumer and prescribing physician.  A deeper problem lies 
beneath this.  We have, perhaps, a unique regulatory structure that 
governs the use of human research subjects.  The regulations in ef-
fect in the United States were written as a direct response to a moral 
problem of exploitation of and harm to human subjects.7  The foun-
dation of these regulations rests upon the Belmont Report, written in 
 2 See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 29 (2004); see also 
Adil E. Shamoo, Medical Research Subjects Must Be Better Protected, DAILY YOMIURI 
ONLINE, June 1, 2006, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/syndicate/2006061dy 
0d.htm.  The ten million subjects only includes those enrolled in drug trials; world-
wide, Shamoo estimates that as many as fifty million persons are currently subjects 
enrolled in research.  Id.  These numbers are almost impossible to calculate accu-
rately, as there is no requirement that participation be reported to anyone and the 
definitions of research can vary.  For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the 
number in the United States falls somewhere between those two estimates, and that 
the international number is also quite large. 
 3 See Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF. 
129, 129–146 (2000). 
 4 Drug companies are dependent on early clinical information to ensure that 
they progress rapidly.  This dependency makes them exquisitely sensitive to legal and 
regulatory actions that facilitate or constrain human experimentation.  Barry Bloom, 
The Role of Human Experimentation in Drug Research, in HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 42 
(Robert L. Bogomolny ed., 1976) (describing in detail drug company dependency 
on human subjects throughout the process of developing and marketing drugs, a 
dependency that has not changed in the thirty years since this article was written). 
 5 PhRMA, the lobbying group for the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, calculated 
that the 2005 worldwide sales by its members amounted to more than $250 billion.  
See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY PROFILE 49 (2006), http://www.pharma.org/files/2006 percent20Industry 
percent20Profile.pdf [hereinafter PHARMA PROFILE]. 
 6 The medical devices industry is subject to similar criticism.  See, e.g., Richard A. 
Friedman, What You Do Know Can’t Hurt You, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A17.  
 7 See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation: Hearing on S. 974, S. 878, and 
S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d 
Cong. 3–5 (1973) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits, 
Ranking Minority Member, S. Comm. on Labor and Welfare). 
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response to a congressional mandate to establish the ethical princi-
ples that must be complied with in order for research to be appropri-
ately conducted on human beings.8  Through a series of legislative 
and regulatory actions,9 the ethical principles explained in the Bel-
mont Report bear the weight of law.  This foundation consists of 
three ethical principles: (1) beneficence, (2) autonomy, and (3) jus-
tice, as well as the specific implications of these principles as ex-
plained in the Belmont Report.10  This Article is concerned with the 
principle of beneficence, which, as described herein, maintains that it 
is of primary and fundamental importance that people who volunteer 
as subjects of dangerous research be assured of a reasonable likeli-
hood of societal benefit resulting from that research. 
 Current controversies about data disclosure and suppression 
reveal that this foundational principle is no longer garnering consis-
tent compliance.11  If the data generated through the use of human 
research subjects is not properly utilized for the benefit of society, the 
research is failing to satisfy this requirement of its legality.  Moreover, 
other forms of legal regulation pertaining to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, which enable it to control financially valuable information, 
diminish the likelihood of the information being made broadly avail-
able,12 further undermining the chance that a research project will 
generate a societal benefit that can pass muster.  This controversy is 
fundamental and deep, and is not cashed out in a discussion of un-
disclosed risk of harm to the public. 
Commentators have noted that suppression and manipulation of 
data concerning prescription drugs presents a critical problem for 
patients and for the overall goals of the scientific community,13 yet 
the connection between this problem and the regulation of human 
research subjects has not been adequately addressed.  Professor Nor-
man Dorsen, as the chair of a panel convened by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the 1970s to examine the FDA’s drug ap-
 8 See Protection of Human Subjects: Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare Apr. 18, 1979) (codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. § 46) [hereinafter Belmont Report]; see also National Research Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202, 88 Stat. 342, 353 (1974) (repealed 1990). 
 9 See National Research Act (setting forth Congress’s statement of intent).  
 10 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 See infra Part III. 
 13 See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health 
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(1980). 
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proval process, recognized some ethical problems regarding data 
suppression and the use of research subjects but did not see the full 
range of legal implications.14  The negative impact of data suppres-
sion on the scientific community was also noted in the early 1980s 
during a robust debate concerning whether drug safety and efficacy 
information submitted by companies to the FDA as part of the drug 
approval process should be subject to Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) disclosure by the FDA.15  This Article contends that many of 
the problems that have arisen since the 1970s regarding accurate in-
formation about drug safety and efficacy could have been averted by 
a proper application of the requirement of benefit from the Belmont 
Report, which would have, in turn, assuaged the ethical concerns ex-
pressed by Professor Dorsen and others. 
Part II of this Article establishes the concept of benefit to society 
as a foundational element within the context of the laws governing 
research on human beings in the United States.16  In context, this 
means that research, in order to be morally proper, must create a so-
cietal benefit.  The merit of the normative value is not particularly 
relevant for purposes of the thesis presented here.  Rather, its impor-
tance lies within the fact that the normative value underlies and is 
explicitly part of the regulatory structure governing human research 
subjects in this country.17  This Part explains what the law requires, 
analyzing the legal framework developed in the 1970s within which 
the current regulations reside.  Benefit to society emerges as far from 
an empty requirement.18
 14 See REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & 
WELFARE, FINAL REPORT (1977) [hereinafter FINAL DORSEN REPORT]; REVIEW PANEL ON 
NEW DRUG REGULATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT  (1977) 
[hereinafter INTERIM DORSEN REPORT]. 
 15 See generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 13; see also Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  But see Toxic Substances Control Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2602(6) 
(2000). 
 16 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 17 For example, during the process of IRB review, an IRB must decide that cer-
tain substantive regulatory requirements will be prospectively met based on the 
study’s design.  One such requirement is that the potential benefits of the trial be 
substantial enough to balance the risk of actual harm to the subjects.  The benefit 
side of this equation is not a benefit that inures directly to the research subject.  It 
means the trial has to be reasonably calculated to contribute a benefit to society.  No 
direct benefit to the trial participants is usually possible or anticipated.  See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.111 (2007).  Data suppression and manipulation are contrary to this require-
ment. 
 18 This analysis is done with the caveat that not all trials on human subjects con-
ducted in this country must submit to regulation by the federal government, an out-
rage to many ethicists who write in this area.  The reach of the regulations is limited 
to trials where the results will be submitted to the FDA or where the study is funded 
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 Part III describes the regulatory and market culture that has 
helped to prematurely bury the benefit requirement.  The legal and 
institutional culture under which research is conducted has under-
gone changes in the last forty years, which has resulted in a fracturing 
of this foundational element, such that research often fails to prop-
erly satisfy it and that no additional safeguards in the approval proc-
ess have been created to ensure its satisfaction.  This Part describes 
the shift from a culture where data dissemination was the norm to 
one where its suppression and manipulation is common.  There are 
multiple reasons for this important change.  During that time, the 
federal government had been pursuing a policy of protecting market 
incentives that, in theory, encouraged pharmaceutical companies to 
innovate.19  For example, as alluded to above, these protections in-
clude the FDA giving trade secret protection to safety and efficacy 
data filed with the FDA by those seeking FDA approval for their drugs 
and devices, which in turn protects this data from disclosure in re-
sponse to FOIA requests.20  Further, many research results that once 
belonged to the federal government by virtue its status as research 
sponsor are now given to private companies who keep the results se-
cret in order to enhance their profitability.21  The policy goals behind 
these schemes are internally coherent for the most part.  In effect, 
the goal is to take data derived from volunteer human research sub-
jects and maximize the profitability that it offers to those who control 
it.  This Part shows how these policy goals conflict with the straight-
forward requirements of the human-research-subject regulations, in 
that one must take the same valuable information and maximize the 
broad societal benefit that can be derived from it in a way that the 
current practices of the pharmaceutical industry cannot satisfy. 
In the last three years, antidepressant use in a pediatric popula-
tion was revealed to be far more dangerous than previously known, 
in any part by the federal government.  From a purely ethical perspective, this raises 
substantial questions.  If one asserts that the federal regulations are ethically re-
quired to be followed, having research conducted that is not compelled to submit to 
these regulations is an ethically suspect endeavor.  Discussion of this is outside the 
scope of this Article, which, again, is not focused on explicating normative claims re-
garding the proper ethical requirements of research conducted on human beings.  
Rather, the legal framework that exists is analyzed in the ethical context in which it 
was developed. 
 19 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 and  35 U.S.C.); see also Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Proce-
dures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000). 
 20 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
 21 See 35 U.S.C. § 202. 
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presenting a valuable case study of the full scope of this problem of 
data suppression and manipulation.22  As a case study, Part IV exam-
ines the recent scandal concerning the pharmaceutical industry’s 
suppression of both the raw data23 and subsequent analysis that 
showed risks of suicidality and of limited or no efficacy for pediatric 
populations using selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs).  
The data was generated using human research subjects in at least fif-
teen drug trials that took place over the course of at least as many 
years.  All of these studies were subject to federal regulations,24 which 
illustrates two important points: first, it shows the persistent failure of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with the requirement of 
conducting a study that creates a benefit for humankind; second, and 
perhaps more importantly, it shows some of the myriad ways that this 
possible benefit is not achieved—more specifically, it shows that the 
potential societal value of the information is lessened through data 
manipulation and suppression. 
The conclusion and recommendations at the end of this Article 
suggest the need to rethink what a commitment to the principle of 
benefit to society means in the context of this Article’s criticisms of 
the current research culture and to examine how the scientific com-
munity and pharmaceutical industry have degraded the benefit that is 
derived. 
At a certain point in medical progress, we use human beings as 
research subjects because their bodies can generate data that we can-
not yet ascertain in any other way.25  In theory, we use these research 
subjects to benefit society and many times there is no possibility of di-
rect benefit for the subjects themselves.  When we do this, we enter a 
highly regulated area with an unusually ethically driven regulatory 
structure. The implications for the drug industry have failed to be 
properly examined with respect to the requirement that research 
must strive to generate a benefit for humankind. 
 22 Alex Berenson, Medical Journal Criticizes Merck Over Vioxx Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
9, 2005, at A1.  Paxil and other antidepressants are used as a case study in this Article 
primarily because Congressional hearings, a lawsuit by the State of New York, and 
other similar events have brought to light an unusual wealth of information about 
what occurred with that class of pharmaceuticals.  See infra Part IV. 
 23 For purposes of clarity, the use of the terms “data” and “datum” in this Article 
refer to information that was collected or derived in some manner from the use of 
human research subjects unless it is stated otherwise in the specific context. 
 24 These studies were all submitted to the FDA, bringing them within the scope of 
the US regulations.  See 5 U.S.C. § 2606(6) (2000). 
 25 CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH 
HUMAN SUBJECTS 6 (2005). 
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II. THE MEANING OF BENEFIT 
This Part explains the role of benefit in analyzing the propriety 
of any particular research proposal and further examines from where 
this concept is derived and why it is legally relevant.  We use human 
beings as research subjects because we, as a society, need information 
gleaned from their bodies to improve our lives.  Research has often 
been defined by contrasting it with the treatment of patients because 
pure research, unlike medical care, is designed to test a hypothesis, 
whereas medical care is performed to treat and heal individual pa-
tients.26  In research, the human subject is being used as a means by 
society to achieve a more general benefit.27
A. Background 
Legal, historical, philosophical, and normative concerns arise 
when we contemplate using humans as research subjects.  To address 
these concerns, we have developed a complex regulatory and ethical 
structure.28  Our concern about human research subjects in the mod-
ern age is often traced back to World War II and the Nazis’ use of 
concentration camp victims as involuntary subjects of medical re-
search.29  The Nuremberg Code, drafted in preparation for the war 
crimes trials of the Nazi officers at those concentration camps, is at 
the root of most subsequent regulatory work.30  The World Medical 
Association adopted the Helsinki Accord in 1964, with subsequent 
amendments, to provide basic guidelines for conducting biomedical 
research.31  Both of these documents are relevant to this Article’s 
analysis, as they are precursors to the Belmont Report and are fre-
quently cited in the supporting reports in its appendix. 
The regulatory structure was developed to ascertain how the use 
of humans could be condoned and conducted in an appropriate 
 26 See Robert J. Levine, The Boundaries Between Biomedical or Behavioral Research and 
the Accepted and Routine Practice of Medicine, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 
app. 1, at 1-1 (1978) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I].  
 27 The benefit that accrues to the subject as part of society is merely the same as 
accrues to all other members, now and in the future. 
 28 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 3–54 (discussing the history of this develop-
ment). 
 29 See Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 7 (2005); 
see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 16–31. 
 30 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25. 
 31 World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki (June 1964) (last amended  
2000), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm [hereinafter Declaration of 
Helsinki]. 
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manner.32  It is important when examining this structure to under-
stand that it is considered inherently problematic to use people in 
the way that research does.33  The overlapping and widely accepted 
principles of respect for persons and the autonomy of individuals, for 
example, discourage the idea of a human body used as a machine by 
and for the benefit of others.34
Once it is conceded that research on humans is problematic, the 
ethical task becomes shaping the research in a manner that will re-
solve the problem or, if this is not possible, that will justify continuing 
with research in its problematic position.  In this context, how do we 
respect a person, protect their autonomy, and somehow not use them 
solely as a means to a greater societal gain, while at the same time 
pursuing our research objectives?  To keep this challenge in perspec-
tive, it is critical to recognize that research does not have to occur.  
While we as a society stand to benefit greatly from this type of re-
search, there is no clear moral obligation upon society to perform 
it.35  As Hans Jonas said, “[o]ur descendants have a right to be left an 
unplundered planet, [but] they do not have a right to a new miracle 
cure. . . . [W]e have not sinned against them if by the time they come 
around arthritis has not yet been conquered (unless by sheer ne-
glect).”36  Medical progress is an optional social goal.  If no person 
volunteers to be a research subject, we have no mechanism in place 
to compel participation.  In such a circumstance, if no volunteers 
were forthcoming, research on volunteers would simply stop.37  Given 
that the pursuit of research is not legally or morally required, it 
 32 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 16–31. 
 33 Much of the literature on human research subjects tangles with this issue.  See 
Maurice Natanson, A Philosophical Perspective on the Assessment of Risk-Benefit Criteria in 
Connection with Research Involving Human Subjects, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 
app. 2, at 21-17 (1978) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II]. 
 34 For further discussion, see David DeGrazia & Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophy, in 
METHODS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 31 (Jeremy Sugarman & Daniel P. Sulmasy eds., 2001). 
 35 See Natanson, supra note 33, at 21-17 (quoting Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflec-
tions on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 228–29 (1969)). 
 36 See id.; see also NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY 
ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, at i (2001), http://www.bio 
ethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/nbac_human_part.pdf [hereinafter BIOETHICS 
COMMISSION] (quoting Jonas, supra note 35, and reaffirming that progress is an op-
tional goal). 
 37 We do have mechanisms in place for conducting research on those who can-
not give consent, such as infants and emergency department patients, and this pre-
sents a more problematic scenario regarding a blanket statement about compelled 
participation.  See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2006).  While permissible under these spe-
cific conditions, there is no legal mandate that this research occur.  See id. 
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should then follow that if research cannot be conducted appropri-
ately, it is not to be conducted at all.  To be explicit, the appropriate 
default position is that no research occurs if it cannot occur properly.  
This default position is important because this Article asserts that 
much of current research sponsored by drug companies is not being 
properly conducted and so should no longer be conducted unless 
these problems are fixed. 
The ethical framework for using human research subjects has a 
peculiarly powerful legal relevance in the United States due to the 
Belmont Report.38  The Belmont Report holds a unique place in 
American legal history.  The Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW), now known as the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS), adopted the very short, philosophical paper to 
form a foundation for its policies for research on human subjects.39  
The Belmont Report explains the “ethical principles and guidelines 
for research involving human subjects.”40  This philosophical paper 
was published in the Federal Register, was commented upon, and 
then became a binding regulation of the federal government.41  It is 
still in effect.42
By adopting this paper as a statement of policy, HHS made its 
ethical, normative analysis of the use of human research subjects part 
of the law.  The regulations that were adopted to govern the use of 
human subjects shortly after completion of the Belmont Report were 
primarily drafted by those responsible for writing the Belmont Re-
port, making the connection between them even clearer.43
 38 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 39 See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (repealed 
1990). 
 40 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 The recommendations of the Commission are “embodied in a living way in the 
regulations” that govern human subject research.  Interview by The National Com-
mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical & Behavioral Research 
with F. William Dommel, Jr., J.D., NIH Liaison to the National Commission, NIH, in 
Bethesda, Md. (Sept. 16, 2004) (Dommel was a staff person for the Commission and 
assisted in drafting the regulations); see also Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., 
Ph.D., Director, Office for Human Research Protections, HHS, with LeRoy B. Wal-
ters, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. Professor of Christian Ethics, Georgetown University, in 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2004) available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont 
ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 [hereinafter Walters Interview] (explaining that 
the Secretary had 180 days to either adopt or respond to the recommendations of 
the Commission.); Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office 
of Human Research Protections, HHS, with Tom Lamar Beauchamp, Ph.D., Senior 
Research Scholar, Kennedy Institute of Ethics in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 2004), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2 
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In the early 1970s, a series of news stories appeared about bio-
medical research and medical treatment that provoked the Senate to 
hold hearings about how research on human subjects was being con-
ducted.  The Tuskegee syphilis study had recently been exposed,44 
along with reports of involuntary sterilization of African-American 
women and unapproved experimentation on newly aborted fetuses.45  
These hearings, in turn, led to the passage of the National Research 
Act,46 which created the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the “Com-
mission”).47
The Commission was given specific charges in its enabling act.  It 
had recommendations and reports on certain topics which it was to 
prepare and then file with the Secretary of HEW.48  The Secretary 
then had 180 days to act on each recommendation either by formu-
lating regulations to implement it or by explaining why the proposal 
was not an appropriate action.49  An observer of current presidential 
bioethics councils will be struck by how the design of the Commission 
differs from those we have seen since.50  By giving it clear topics, as-
signments, and dates by which it was to complete its work, and by or-
dering the Secretary to respond within six months to its recommen-
[hereinafter Beauchamp Interview] (“Interviewer: ‘The [Belmont Report] is pretty 
clearly the basis for the regulations[?]’ Beauchamp: ‘Yeah.’”); Interview by The Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research with Bonnie M. Lee, B.A., Associate Director for Human Subject Pro-
tection Policy, FDA, in Rockville, Md. (Aug. 13, 2004) (explaining that the 1981 HHS 
and FDA IRB regulations were based on the Commission’s recommendations and 
that the 1991 Common Rule is very similar); Interview by Patricia C. El-Hinnawy, Of-
fice for Human Research Protections, HHS, with Norman Fost, M.D., Professor of 
Pediatrics, University of Wisconsin Medical School, in Madison, Wis. (May 13, 2004), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2 
[hereinafter Fost Interview] (The “Commission [was] unlike any other in the history 
of this country . .  . in that it had this statutory authority to write rules, which would 
become law . . . unless changed by the Secretary of [HHS.]”). 
 44 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 39–45. 
 45 Senate Hearings, supra note 7. 
 46 See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (repealed 
1990). 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Id.  According to language in the Act, the recommendation from the Commis-
sion would then become law if the Secretary failed to act within the proper time 
frame.  Id. 
 50 For a discussion of these commissions, see The President's Council on Bioethics 
and Approaches to Public Deliberation Taken by National Bioethics Commissions, 15 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 221–322 (2005). 
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dations or the recommendation would be binding, the Commission 
was designed to effectively make and implement policy in this area. 
The Belmont Report was written by the Commission in response 
to its charge to “identify the basic ethical principles that should un-
derlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving 
human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be followed 
to assure that such research is conducted in accordance with these 
principles.”51
Due to the legislative background of the Commission’s work, the 
normative values that are described in the Belmont Report and other 
writings by it have an important role in analyzing whether any one 
particular type of research on human subjects is legal.  This role is 
fundamentally different from other normative studies related to the 
development of laws, because the work of the Commission is not 
merely useful as evidence of intent of the type found in legislative his-
tory.  Rather, in the case of the Belmont Report, it is part of the ac-
tual regulatory framework that governs this type of research.52
As we examine what the guiding principles are for research on 
humans, it will become clear that certain ethical requirements must 
be met in each separate incident of research.  One such requirement 
is that the study must be designed to generate certain benefits to so-
ciety53—benefits that must, under the rules, be anticipated in the de-
sign of the study and accrue from that study alone.54  However, these 
benefits are primarily measured by assessing the possible advance-
ment of scientific knowledge derived from analyzing any data gener-
ated by the study, not contributions to some larger economic or so-
cial scheme.55
To reiterate, research on human subjects is an inherently selfish 
undertaking by society.  Society hopes to benefit from the use of a 
human’s body in circumstances where the human does not stand to 
benefit directly on his or her own from this same use.56  The most ba-
sic requirement of research, as demanded by the Belmont Report, is 
 51 Levine, supra note 26. 
 52 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 The subject is not, individually, conceived as a beneficiary by the researcher.  
There is a problem with informed consent called the therapeutic misconception, 
whereby a subject believes he or she is likely to benefit from participation in a study, 
even when this is impossible or unlikely.  When this arises, it is a problem with in-
formed consent and is not part of the benefit analysis.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, su-
pra note 1, at 9.  
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that we must not undertake this research unless the possible benefit 
to society is substantial enough to justify this use of humans.57  This 
requirement alone is certainly not enough to satisfy all ethical re-
quirements for proper use of human research subjects; it is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition.58  
Two separate claims are made here about the regulatory struc-
ture governing research on human subjects.  The first is that a poten-
tial benefit to society, or to phrase it differently, to humankind, is a 
fundamental requirement of the design of all research conducted on 
human beings subject to federal regulations.  It is the first quality of a 
proposed research project that must be assessed, and if it is absent 
the research project cannot go forward.59
The second claim is that the benefit, for purposes of this type of 
analysis, must be assessed as to the probability of it being generated 
within the boundaries of the individual proposed research project.60  
It cannot be enhanced through the addition of possible externalities 
that could benefit humanity, such as the profitability of drug compa-
nies.    
B. Foundational Status of the Concept of Benefit 
1. Early Foundations and the Belmont Report 
This Article claims foundational status for the requirement that 
a study on human subjects must be designed to benefit society.  This 
requirement is embodied in United States law,61 and is also explicitly 
present in the Nuremburg Code62 and the Helsinki Accord.63  This 
goal of research appears to be assumed as a primary motivator for re-
search by participants writing in this field.64  Due to changes in the 
culture in which research is now conducted, those who sponsor and 
conduct studies have changed their motivation.65  Because of this cul-
tural change, it is necessary to carefully examine the immutable re-
sponsibilities that this foundational requirement of benefit actually 
 57 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  The other requirements are autonomy and justice.  Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2006). 
 62 See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 181–83 (1949) [hereinafter NUREMBERG]. 
 63 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 31. 
 64 See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra Part III. 
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imposes on those who would conduct research on humans, as this re-
quirement can no longer simply be assumed to be satisfied. 
Paragraph two of the Nuremberg Code states that an “experi-
ment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, 
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random 
or unnecessary in nature.”66  The primary legal and scholarly focus 
since World War II has been on ensuring the voluntary, informed 
consent of research subjects.  The Nazis used concentration camp 
prisoners as objects of their experiments.  Many of the research scan-
dals in the United States involved subjects who were not given ade-
quate opportunity to decide for themselves if they wished to be a part 
of a specific research project.67  In light of these events, issues con-
cerning consent and exploitation of subjects have dominated the dis-
cussion, for example, as to whether consent is truly voluntarily given 
(such as with prisoners or hospitalized patients) and how to ensure 
sufficient information has been disclosed concerning risks to make a 
subsequent consent truly informed.68
The concept of benefit derived from research has had a poor 
history in terms of scholarly focus—it is depended upon, but a bit 
taken for granted.  Scientific research has historically been con-
ducted for the dual purposes of acquiring respect from one’s peers 
and the betterment of humankind.69  Publication of research in peer-
reviewed journals accomplished both of these goals, which gave the 
more prestigious journals tremendous power in the scientific com-
munity.70  The history of biomedical research is filled with people 
who took risks on themselves, their children, and innumerable vul-
nerable subjects to prove a hypothesis that would later save lives.71  It 
is also filled with those whose hypotheses failed, even after also put-
ting subjects at a high level of risk.72
The early framework for biomedical research in this country, 
dating back to the foundation of Johns Hopkins Medical School and 
 66 NUREMBERG, supra note 62. 
 67 See, e.g., M. P. KING, The Dangers of Difference, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35 
(1992). 
 68 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
 69 See infra Part IV; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 n.17 (1987). 
 70 See Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability, 135 ANNALS 
OF INTERNAL MED. 463, 463–66 (2001).  
 71 M.H. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN 31–174 
(1967). 
 72 Id. 
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the Rockefeller University in the early 1900s, was of researchers work-
ing without any expectation of profiting financially from their work.73  
It is difficult in the current environment to imagine this, but many 
researchers and academic research centers expressly eschewed finan-
cial motivations, worried that it could corrupt the research enter-
prise.74  This continued into the 1970s. Dr. Albert Jonsen, a member 
of the Commission, stated in an interview conducted in 2004 that “at 
the time the Commission was working, researchers rarely even 
thought of profiting from anything they might produce.  That’s what 
they did, and it became a public good.”75
Biomedical researchers were focused on variable degrees of so-
cial good, public benefit, and their own acclaim upon publication.76  
The concern was that the researchers were liable to not sufficiently 
respect the individual persons upon whom their experiments were 
being conducted.77  This logically led to the scholarly focus on the 
voluntary nature of the subject’s undertaking and the question of in-
formed consent.  With researchers fueled by a sense of pursuing a 
greater social good, the risk was of exploitation and damage to an in-
dividual’s autonomy.  In the early years of successful biomedical re-
search in the United States, the language of the more prominent fig-
ures was of fighting a battle on disease, and their losses of research 
subjects have been justified as necessary losses.78  A crude utilitarian 
argument held sway, fueled by a paternalistic relationship between 
doctors and patients that already failed to give adequate voice to a pa-
tient’s autonomy.79
In light of this culture there are two sets of concerns reflected in 
the Belmont Report, and which still hold sway in the field.  The first 
is with the prevention of gross crimes such as those that occurred 
 73 See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST 
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 11–87 (2004), for a history of the culture of research at these insti-
tutions in the early 1900s. 
 74 Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 181 nn.8–9 . 
 75 Interview by The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research with Albert R. Jonsen, Ph.D., Professor of 
Medical Ethics, University of California at San Francisco Medical School, in San 
Francisco, Cal. (May 14, 2004). 
 76 Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding Effect in Sci-
ence: Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: 
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 61 (Wendy Wagner & Rena 
Steinzor eds., 2006). 
 77 See infra notes 170–77 and accompanying text. 
 78 See generally JAY KATZ, EXERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1972). 
 79 BARRY, supra note 73; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 14–16; see generally JAY 
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (2002). 
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with the Nazis and, on a smaller scale, in the Tuskegee syphilis stud-
ies.80  The second is with how to impose a balance upon the profes-
sion, with the desire to achieve a benefit on one hand and the rights 
of the research subjects on the other.81
The Belmont Report is divided into three parts.  Part A defines 
the boundaries between practice and research.82  This section serves 
the purpose of showing that when research occurs, it must be subject 
to review by an institutional review board (IRB).83  The goal is to de-
fine research broadly in order that the protections provided by an 
IRB review will be broadly available to those subjects who will need 
it.84  Part B delineates the basic ethical principles that are relevant to 
the ethics of research involving human subjects.85  These principles 
are respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.86  Part C describes 
where it is anticipated these general principles delineated in Part B 
will be applied.87   
Principle One,88 respect for persons,  is similar to Paragraph One 
of the Nuremberg Code, which states that the voluntary consent of 
the human subject is absolutely essential.89  Respect for persons is a 
principle that engages ideas of autonomy, and, for those who cannot 
exercise autonomy, a requirement that they be adequately pro-
tected.90
Principle Three, justice, may be implicated in the problem iden-
tified here, though the requirements of justice as delineated in the 
Belmont Report do not make as clear-cut a case for requiring disclo-
sure of research data.91  “Who ought to receive the benefits of re-
search and bear its burdens?”92  This is a question that brings issues of 
 80 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,192. 
 81 Id. at 23,192–93. 
 82 Id. at 23,193. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Levine, supra note 26. 
 85 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193–94. 
 86 Id.  The primary author of the Belmont Report, Thomas Beauchamp, working 
with Jim Childress, a philosopher who had also been involved in the project of pre-
paring the Belmont Report, wrote The Principles of Biomedical Ethics soon after publica-
tion of the Report, explaining these principles in greater detail.  BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 1. 
 87 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193–94. 
 88 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 89 NUREMBERG, supra note 62. 
 90 Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
 91 Interestingly, a claim could be made that justice arguments support a pharma-
ceutical industry that generates a net societal gain. 
 92 See Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
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societal benefits to the forefront, in the context of who the proper 
subjects of research are.  For example, if the poor are subjects of re-
search, yet only the wealthy receive subsequent medical care as a re-
sult of that research, have we created an affront to notions of justice?  
Arguably, it is entirely exploitative to have a class of research subjects 
who do not stand to be recipients of the benefit that may be derived 
from the results of the trial, even as members in the broader societal 
group. 
Principle Two, beneficence, is the relevant portion of Part B of 
the Belmont Report for purposes of this Article’s analysis.  The con-
cept of beneficence is complicated in the Belmont Report; there is an 
economy used in stating principles in this Report93 and each one is 
expected to move the project of the Commission quite far. 
The principle of beneficence is used to describe both the man-
date to do no harm and the mandate to maximize benefits and 
minimize possible harms from the research project as a whole.94  The 
concept “do no harm” comes from the Hippocratic Oath, as stated 
directly in the Belmont Report.95  This concept is included at the be-
ginning of the discussion, rather than an end point.96  The challenge 
for the drafters of the Belmont Report, and the challenge generally 
in this area, is how to ethically justify an undertaking that exposes an 
individual to a risk of harm with no expectation of an immediate, 
physical, or direct benefit to the subject.  The Belmont Report asserts 
that learning both what will benefit patients and what will cause them 
risk is an integral part of the process of protecting each individual pa-
tient, and thus makes the biomedical research agenda acceptable 
notwithstanding the requirement that the treating physician “do no 
harm.”97  In effect, by learning how to treat patients more effectively 
in general, one is acting within the requirement to do no harm.98
The Belmont Report asserts that since learning these facts may 
require exposing subjects to risk, the next challenge under benefi-
cence is to assess “when it is justified to seek certain benefits despite 
 93 See id. at 23,193–94; see also generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1. 
 94 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
 95 Id.  Interestingly, the use of the Hippocratic Oath reflects the role of physicians 
in defining the ethics of research on humans, though scientists without medical de-
grees conduct much of modern research. 
 96 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
 97 Id. 
 98 This argument seems to stem from a desire to pursue research on human sub-
jects even while recognizing that it is ethically problematic for physicians to do so in 
light of the Hippocratic Oath, with its stated duty to the well-being of the individual 
patient. 
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the risks involved.”99  Beneficence is the concept that normatively jus-
tifies the research endeavor—the same motivation for the betterment 
of humankind that historically led physicians and scientists to con-
duct biomedical research on human beings.100  It introduces the con-
cept of benefit and the challenge of finding an appropriate balance 
between the benefit and acceptable levels of risk to the subject. 
2. Explication of the Principles of the Belmont Report 
In preparing the Belmont Report, the Commission requested 
specific people to prepare a number of reports on issues relevant to 
identifying and defining the principles to be respected in conducting 
research—these reports were published in a two-volume appendix.101  
In searching for the meaning of benefit as used both in the Belmont 
Report and in the literature on this issue generally, it is helpful to see 
how that concept is treated by the authors of the different reports in 
the appendix. 
Dr. Robert Levine prepared a series of reports for this project of 
the Commission.102  His first report, and the first in the appendix, 
seeks to delineate the boundaries between research on human sub-
jects and medical practice on patients.103  This report was prepared 
primarily because, in distinguishing between these two kinds of sub-
jects, a definition of research had been developed.  Levine states that 
“[w]hile the health care professional might be assumed to see the 
well-being of the patient as the most important end, the investigator 
is assumed to see development of new knowledge as a major, if not 
ultimate, end.”104  What we see here is the role played by this assump-
tion of the investigator’s motive, the development of new knowledge. 
In Dr. Levine’s second report, concerning the role of risk-benefit 
criteria, he analyzes in some detail what an IRB should properly con-
sider when analyzing risk and benefit for purposes of approval of a 
 99 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
 100 See PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 8–12 (criticizing human experimentation that 
forgets beneficence and looks only to the value of knowledge). 
 101 See BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra note 26; BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II, 
supra note 33. 
 102 See BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra note 26, at 1-1 to 4-103. 
 103 See generally Levine, supra note 26.   
 104 Id. at 1-4.  The Common Rule is the popular name for the assortment of rules 
governing research on human subjects that have been agreed upon by the majority 
of federal agencies. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
622 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:605 
 
research proposal.105  The two concepts of risk and benefit are closely 
related and do not necessarily occupy entirely separate columns.  For 
example, if the goal of research is to benefit society, one possible risk 
of not doing research is a loss of this societal benefit.106
One important requirement of the Belmont Report107 and the 
Common Rule108 is that research be designed to enhance the prob-
ability of something relevant being discovered.  This requirement is 
tied to the concept of benefit in this report, where Dr. Levine states: 
There is no way to separate the issue of quality of scientific design 
of research from the ethical considerations as to whether it 
should be done.  If research is badly designed, it is not likely to 
benefit anyone[.]  [I]t seems inappropriate to put human beings 
at risk to develop information (or misinformation) that cannot 
conceivably benefit either the individual or society.109
Dr. Levine also references the Nuremburg Code as giving sup-
port to this concept; it states “[t]he experiment should be such as to 
yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other 
methods or means of study, and not random or unnecessary in na-
ture.”110  Dr. Levine cements his adoption of this concept from the 
Nuremberg Code by then stating that “[i]t is inappropriate to put 
humans at risk to gain information that can be secured without put-
ting humans at risk.”111
This principle is important here because it tells us how a re-
search proposal is to be measured: first, by what it hopes to accom-
plish for society, and, second, how well it is designed to accomplish 
that task.112  Some minimum must be met in the quality of design for 
accomplishing this task (the good of society) for the research to be 
an ethical and appropriate undertaking. 
Dr. Levine contemplates benefits to society and benefits to the 
individuals who are the research subjects (as does the Belmont Re-
port).113  In analyzing benefits to society, Dr. Levine divides research 
 105 See Robert J. Levine, The Role of Assessment of Risk Benefit Criteria in the Determina-
tion of the Appropriateness of Research Involving Human Subjects, in BELMONT REPORT 
APPENDIX I, supra note 26, at 2-3. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
 108 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2006). 
 109 Levine, supra note 104, at 2-30. 
 110 Id. at 2-32 (citing NUREMBERG, supra note 62).  
 111 Id. at 2-32. 
 112 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,195–96. 
 113 See Levine, supra note 105, at 2-32 to 2-33; see also Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
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into four categories, only the first of which is relevant here.114  This 
category of research is applied biomedical and behavioral research, 
which he defines as research for developing and perfecting diagnos-
tic, prophylactic, and therapeutic modalities.115
For this type of research, Dr. Levine makes it clear that the bene-
fits to society that should be relevant in the IRB analysis are those that 
are potentially generated by that specific project.116  This supports the 
assertion made earlier in this Article that one cannot satisfy the re-
quirement of a benefit by claiming a net societal good from our 
pharmaceutical industry as currently constructed.117  As Dr. Levine 
explains, it is far easier to demonstrate the benefit of research in 
general than of any particular proposed research project.118  For ex-
ample, the benefits to society of antibiotics, or of a particular antibi-
otic, are quite large.  This does not result in any study of antibiotics 
presumptively satisfying the requirement that it be likely to produce a 
benefit merely because the focus is on this generally beneficial sub-
stance.  At the same time, “some well-conceived research projects 
have yielded no valuable drugs”; nevertheless, pursuing them was not 
unethical.119  “When speaking of a particular research proposal one 
can only discuss potential or hoped for benefit.”120  This is a complex 
undertaking that requires an examination of the details of the study 
being proposed, divorced from the generalized notion of societal 
benefit of the pharmaceutical industry generally.121  Dr. Levine also 
includes possible negative findings, those that show a failure of effi-
cacy, as potentially counting towards the assessment of the benefit of 
a proposed study.122  It seems accurate to interpret this language as 
asserting that a reference to a broad, historical, achieved benefit is 
not appropriate in a risk-benefit analysis performed by an IRB. 
Dr. Levine’s report gives detailed consideration to what an IRB is 
meant to consider when assessing benefit in the risk-benefit analy-
 114 The other three are basic research using human subjects, basic research not 
using human subjects, and social research.  Levine, Assessment, supra note 105. 
 115 Id., at 2-32.  Dr. Levine considers how economic benefit can be considered and 
uses it in a benefit equation as those economic benefits that come from a reduction 
of cost in the treatment of the specific illness whose treatment is being tested.  Id. 
 116 Id. at 2-32 to 2-33. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Levine, supra note 105, at 2-33. 
 121 Id. at 2-36 to 2-44. 
 122 Id.  “[R]esearch that proves with certainty that a specific . . . maneuver is not 
valuable . . . safe . . . [or] effective [] also benefits society.”  Id. at 2-33. 
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sis.123  The IRB must identify the benefit that is hoped for at that spe-
cific time, from that specific project.124  This “hoped-for” benefit 
needs to be described to an IRB in the context of the expected bene-
fit to the subject and to society.125  It is meant to be described with 
some detailed analysis of probability and magnitude, and the analysis 
should consider expected duration of all aspects of the benefit.126  
Duration of a benefit is often connected to the plans of the study 
sponsor and can have an important impact on the calculus of both 
individual and societal benefits.127  An example of a duration issue 
given in the report is where a drug is proven to have a beneficial mo-
dality in a small number of subjects, yet the sponsor decides to dis-
continue producing it.128  In this hypothetical, the sponsor’s decision 
is driven by the fact that the study has failed to show the drug is bene-
ficial to a sufficient number of individuals to make its further devel-
opment worth the sponsor’s continued investment.129
Dr. Levine’s report appears to call for a complex and nuanced 
assessment of the benefit of a particular study.  The report also ex-
plicitly states that the possible benefit from that study is potentially 
reduced based on what the study sponsor may do in the future with 
the fruits of the study.130  This analysis has critical implications for the 
effect of current behaviors of the drug industry on IRB considera-
tions. 
In another report prepared for the Commission in anticipation 
of the Belmont Report, H. Tristram Engelhardt outlines what he be-
lieves are the basic ethical principles that are implicated concerning 
human experimentation.131  He arrives at three principles.132  The first 
is respect for persons as free moral agents.133  The second is a concern 
to support the best interests of human subjects in research.134  The 
 123 Id. at 2-44 to 2-54. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Levine, supra note 105, at 2-50. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 2-51. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Basic Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research Involving Human Subjects, in BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra 
note 26, at 8-1 to 8-2. 
 132 Id. at 8-8. 
 133 Id.  This is not surprising. The backdrop of historical events where this particu-
lar principle was violated has consistently made this the most prominent issue dis-
cussed in this area. 
 134 Id. 
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third, and most relevant here, is an interest in assuring that the use of 
human subjects in experimentation will, in sum, redound to the 
benefit of society.135  He expands on this third moral principle by stat-
ing that one should have concern to maximize the benefits accruable 
to society from research involving human subjects.136
The conflict Engelhardt perceives with these three principles is 
to some degree insoluble.  We are putting individuals at risk for soci-
ety’s general benefit, and so we are using them.  How do we justify 
this?  Importantly, we make sure their choices are voluntary and in-
formed, as protected by his first principle.137  Equally important, as 
reflected in his three principles, is to make sure their sacrifice is not 
for a frivolous purpose.  The identified beneficiary is society, and part 
of the job in policing research is to ensure that society’s interest is not 
squandered. 
Philosopher Maurice Natanson’s paper for the Commission, A 
Philosophical Perspective on the Assessment of Risk-Benefit Criteria in Connec-
tion with Research Involving Human Subjects,138 like Engelhardt’s report, 
shows who the contemplated beneficiaries are in this risk-benefit cal-
culation.  “Ultimately, society itself is said to benefit from the advance 
of medical knowledge . . . [one cannot] reduce the meaning of bene-
fit to patient-benefit alone.”139  The issue in Natanson’s paper is bal-
ancing the needs of society and the rights of individuals.140  In assess-
ing what individuals are being asked to undergo, he recognizes that 
even minimal or acceptable risk may mean severe suffering or death 
to some.141  He then worries, as “it is not easy to reconcile medical in-
tervention done with a bare minimum of ethicality with serving the 
good of society.  It would seem that such intervention has only a lim-
ited connection with the welfare of the patient-subject but a powerful 
relationship to the abstract development of medical knowledge.”142  
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 8-5. 
 137 Natanson, supra note 33, at 8-9. 
 138 Id. at 21-1. 
 139 Id. at 21-12. 
 140 Id. at 21-15. 
 141 Id. at 21-12.  There was a recent reminder of the meaning of an acceptable de-
gree of risk in the Phase 1 trial conducted in England in the spring of 2006, where 
six healthy young men were given a drug known as TGN1412 and quickly went into 
multiple organ failure.  Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial 
of the Anti-CD28 Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1018, 1018–19 
(2006).  At the time this Article was printed, their prognosis was unknown, though it 
appeared grim; signs of rapidly developing cancers were detected in two of the trial 
subjects since the study took place.  Id. at 1022. 
 142 Natanson, supra note 33, at 21-18. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
626 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:605 
 
Clearly, from his perspective, there are two actors in this analysis—
society in general and the individual research subject. 
In an essay prepared by Dr. Lawrence Raisz, we also see this pre-
sumed limitation on the beneficiaries to be considered.143  As he dis-
cusses the proper components of informed consent, he details what 
information should be made clear to a possible research subject who 
is not going to experience any physical benefit from participation in 
the study.144  “It does seem appropriate to tell the volunteers in a 
study what the expected benefits to the other members of society 
might be . . . [, as] any volunteer should have the privilege of know-
ing why they are being asked to take a risk.”145  Note that this implies, 
in the inverse, that the only possible reason for being asked to take a 
risk, such as one contemplated here, is a potential benefit to society, 
and it is the delineation of this benefit that proper informed consent 
requires.  The choice presumably faced by the individual is whether 
or not the potential benefit is enough, in his or her own mind, for 
him or her to undergo the risk. 
3. Interviews with Contributors to the Belmont Report 
In 2004, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)  
conducted a series of interviews with the participants in the original 
Commission of the 1970s.146  In the interviews, some of the partici-
pants alluded to the concept of benefit, or beneficence, and to soci-
ety as the proper beneficiary.147  The interview with Tom Beauchamp, 
who worked for the Commission as a staff philosopher and was the 
principal author of the Belmont Report, is an example.148  He stated 
that, in his opinion, the biggest failure in the IRB system is that peo-
ple do not adequately understand the implications of the rules and 
guidelines.  “Being a research subject is a burden . . . .  The whole 
point of research is to protect people against injury and disease and 
the like . . . so it becomes a balancing consideration.”149  To refer to 
the whole point of research as protecting people, as he does here, is 
 143 Lawrence C. Raisz, Essay on Some Problems of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Clinical Phar-
macology, in BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II, supra note 33, at 22-1. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 HHS Office for Human Research Protections, Oral History Archive, http:// 
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 (last visited Jan. 25, 
2008). 
 147 See Beauchamp Interview, supra note 43. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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to make it clear that the only acceptable end point of research is that 
protection. 
Michael Yesley’s interview brought up two relevant issues.150  The 
first was his concern that human subject protections have become 
both over- and under-regulated, as the regulations have tended to fo-
cus on the “minutiae of regulatory compliance” and missed the broad 
goal they were meant to achieve.151  One of his primary concerns was 
with the international research currently being conducted.152  This 
concern has bearing on the concept of society as the beneficiary of 
research and relates to outsourcing the risk of research.153  Along with 
other challenges to international research, such concerns often focus 
on the community where the research is occurring, and how, in many 
cases, that population is not likely to ever benefit from the medicines 
or devices that are being tested.154  This is particularly true of a popu-
lation that does not suffer from a problem or one that has a limited 
or no medical infrastructure with which to provide any required care 
of the type being tested. 
The concern among those studying the ethics of international 
research from this perspective is that there may be a requirement 
under the justice principle of the Belmont Report and other bio-
ethical structures that use a principle-based analysis that “society” be 
read to include the more immediate community where research is 
being conducted as a likely beneficiary.155  It is potentially too ex-
ploitative to have the human subjects on one side undertaking the 
inherent risks, and then to have a community far removed from them 
as the probable recipient of the hoped-for benefit.156  This adds a nu-
ance to the concept of “benefit to society” discussed here.  In effect, 
the society that stands as the beneficiary should be drawn narrowly 
enough to satisfy the requirements of justice as described in the Bel-
mont Report and as embodied in the Common Rule.  Analyzing this 
from a justice perspective reinforces what a benefit is in this context: 
something concrete a society can hope to actually have. 
 150 Interview by Patricia C. El-Hinnawy, Office for Human Research Protections, 
HHS, with Michael Yesley, J.D., Manager, Ethic, Legal and Social Implications, Hu-
man Genome Project, in Santa Fe, N.M. (Aug. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 [hereinafter 
Yesley Interview]. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Yesley Interview, supra note 150. 
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Norman Fost, interviewed in May 2004, spoke of science and the 
advancement of knowledge, using the concepts apparently inter-
changeably in discussing the conflict between the subject and the 
goal of research.157  When you are doing research, 
[y]ou’re not doing it for the interest of the subject, you’re asking 
him or her to sacrifice their interests in the name of science. . . . 
[I]n the research setting, the interest of the subject is never the 
primary interest.  The primary interest is always to advance 
knowledge.  And the question is how to do that in a way that’s 
ethically acceptable.158
Albert Jonsen felt that beneficence is defined “quite narrowly” in 
the Belmont Report.159  “We talk about ‘beneficence’ in a relatively 
general way as bringing some benefit to the subject . . . and [a] bene-
fit to society, but then we immediately make the practical application 
of risk-benefit assessment.”160  In his opinion, beneficence as used in 
the Belmont Report could be “susceptible of broader interpreta-
tion.”161
Jonsen felt that in this current decade conflicts of interest are 
emerging as a critical problem related to beneficence: 
[N]ow the question, I think, has to do with researcher’s affiliation 
with commercial enterprises and with the opportunity of the cli-
nician to get patents—or the researcher to get patents to profit by 
the work that he or she is doing.  And at the time the Commission 
was working, researchers rarely even thought of profiting from 
anything that they might produce.  That’s what they did, and it 
became a public good.162
He then went on to say this problem is “a matter of beneficence, be-
cause one of the problems in conflict of interest is what benefit is mo-
tivating this work, and who gets that benefit.”163
Robert Cooke, another interviewee, when asked which principle 
was most important, said: 
 157 Fost Interview, supra note 43. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office for Human 
Research Protections, HHS, with Albert R. Jonsen, Ph.D., Professor of Medical Eth-
ics, Univ. of Cal. at San Francisco Med. School, in San Francisco, Cal. (May 14, 2004), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2 
[hereinafter Jonsen Interview]. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See id.; see also Walters Interview, supra note 43. 
 163 Jonsen Interview, supra note 159.  He also believes conflicts of interest impli-
cate the other two principles, as well.  Id. 
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Well, as a researcher, you’d like to think that beneficence would 
be the most important; because why do you do research unless 
you’re trying to help somebody out?  But from my standpoint the 
greatest protection comes from respect for persons.  It really 
means that you value someone as a human being, and not just as a 
subject of research.164
From this and other quotes, it becomes clear that benefit to so-
ciety was already an important part of research ethics before the Bel-
mont Report.  The Belmont Report made benefit to society explicitly 
part of the regulatory policy for the United States government.  It did 
this in the context of adding a requirement for a rigorous assessment 
of benefit in a risk-benefit analysis.165  The discussion of respect for 
persons really added something new, especially as it was viewed as al-
most in competition with the desire for a benefit for society.  One has 
to balance the two to achieve ethically conducted research, but both 
must be there in adequate quantities and qualities.  Each is necessary 
but neither, alone, is sufficient.  Cooke also expressed his own worry 
about beneficence in the modern era, stating “[t]he individual inves-
tigator, without any kind of review would be a disaster[;] they may 
have great financial benefit and at times, maybe benefit to humanity 
isn’t the primary consideration.”166
III. THE CHANGING CULTURE OF  
MEDICAL RESEARCH—THE DECLINE OF BENEFICENCE 
As shown in Part II, when the Belmont Report was written, be-
neficence was assumed to be a primary motivator of researchers and 
its presence is now a necessary regulatory component of an accept-
able research proposal.  As this Part will demonstrate, a number of 
legal and financial changes to the environment in which research oc-
curs have altered the motivations and conduct of researchers, such 
that the financial goals of drug companies are now the primary value 
being served in much of the research being conducted, and the rele-
vant requirement of beneficence, to generate a benefit for human-
kind, is at risk.  As discussed in Part II, the regulations now in place 
governing research on human beings actually have the power to 
make sufficient demands on research to rectify this problem in all 
 164 Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office for Human 
Research Protections, HHS, with Robert E. Cooke, Chairman, Department of Pediat-
rics, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, in Baltimore, Md. (May 15, 2004) available at  
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
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studies that are required to comply with the federal regulations 
drafted in connection with the Belmont Report. However, the ramifi-
cations of the cultural shift described here have not been properly 
recognized or responded to by the research community in the con-
text of this regulatory power.  Commentators as varied as Norman 
Dorsen and LeRoy Walters have noted the ethical ramifications of a 
failure to satisfy the beneficence requirement, yet never made the fi-
nal, necessary connection to the regulations that can affect change.167
We have moved from a world where the search for answers was 
an assumed primary motivator of research to one where a prudent 
person understands that the suppression and manipulation of data 
that occurred with SSRI safety and efficacy data can easily happen 
with other drugs or medical devices.  If this broad cultural shift had 
not occurred, one could argue that cases such as those described in 
Part IV, below, were occasional problems of a type that is not new or 
particularly remarkable and which require no broad reassessment of 
how studies should be assessed.168  Given the cultural shift described 
here, however, it is clear we can no longer focus primarily on accept-
able risks and informed consent.  The benefit requirement for ac-
ceptable studies appears to be failing.  In response to this, a con-
certed effort to identify and judge the potential benefit of a given 
study, such as is called for by Dr. Levine, with particular attention 
paid to a sponsor’s ability and motivation to distort data, needs to oc-
cur in any study that is placed before an IRB.169
In past centuries, those under his power often justifiably feared 
the medical researcher.170  The researcher characteristically had a ro-
bust ego and a sense of being in a battle against disease for the bet-
terment of humanity.171  Fueled by this sense of mission, a researcher 
 167 See Walters Interview, supra note 43; see also INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, supra note 
14, at D-39. 
 168 See infra Part IV.  For example, drug companies have been successfully sued by 
consumers for withholding and falsifying safety and efficacy data as early as the 
1950s.  Note the cases about the drug MER/29, where side effects such as cataracts, 
baldness, severe skin reactions, and sexual depression were not properly disclosed by 
the manufacturer.  See PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 175 (quoting MORTON MINTZ, 
THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1971)). 
 169 Levine, supra note 26.  How such an assessment should occur is a complex 
question and, in the past, would likely have been the subject of a new commission’s 
analysis.  However, given the politicizing of the Bioethics Commission enterprise in 
recent years, this Article hesitates to make such a recommendation.  See Madison 
Powers, Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise, 15 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 305 
(2005). 
 170 PAPPWORTH, supra note 71. 
 171 See H.K. BEECHER, CLINICAL INVESTIGATION: MEDICAL, ETHICAL, AND MORAL 
ASPECTS  (1963) (“Any classification of human experimentation as ‘for the good of 
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could forgive himself for maltreatment of those who passed through 
his hands, and researchers often felt justified in imposing a level of 
risk on their subjects that would be incomprehensibly high today.172  
Coupled with the desire to learn something new was a cultural focus 
on publication and the corresponding respect of peers in the same 
fields.173  Dr. Levine, described earlier as a participant in the reports 
prepared for the Belmont Report, and one of the original and pre-
eminent scholars on clinical research ethics, noted in 1986 that 
“[m]ost scientists [were, at that time,] under great pressure to con-
duct research and publish it.  Publication [was] the sole route to pro-
fessional success, to salary increases, to tenure, to promotion.  Scien-
tists, therefore, regard[ed] the terms and conditions of publication as 
matters of considerable importance.”174
Patients were often viewed as tools or raw material by these re-
searchers.175  This problem is what the concept of a subject’s self-
determination or autonomy was meant to address, as described in 
Part B of the Belmont Report.176  The requirement of truly informed 
consent, including a serious attempt by the researcher to explain the 
risks to be faced by the subject and with the subject holding enough 
society’ is to be viewed with distaste, even alarm.  Undoubtedly, all sound work has 
this as its ultimate aim, but such high-flown expressions are not necessary, and have 
been used within living memory as cover for outrageous ends.” (quoted in 
PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 28)). 
 172 A highly regarded scientist, in a speech before an international audience in 
1961 on what made a brilliant researcher, said that “[t]he desire to alleviate suffering 
is of small value in research—such a person should be advised to work for charity.  
Research wants egoists, damned egoists, who seek their own pleasure and satisfac-
tion, but find it in solving the puzzles of nature.”  PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 11 
(quoting Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgi). 
 173 See Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 181. 
 174 See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 28 n.74 (2d 
ed. 1986) (quoting Y. Brackbill & A.E. Hellegers, Ethics and Editors, HASTINGS CTR. 
REPORT 174 (1980)); see also Norman W. Storer, The Internationality of Science and the 
Nationality of Scientists (stating that in 1970, scientists were centrally motivated by 
credit, recognition, and celebration by other scientists), in EXPERIMENTATION WITH 
HUMAN BEINGS 118 (Jay Katz ed., 1972) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION]; Derek J. de 
Solla Price, Science Since Babylon, in EXPERIMENTATION, supra, at 116 (researchers “seek 
an immortal brainchild in order to perpetuate themselves,” and they refer fondly to a 
time when it was possible “for men to fashion bricks of science engraved with their 
own names”). 
 175 See ROBERT VEATCH, THE PATIENT AS PARTNER: A THEORY OF HUMAN-
EXPERIMENTATION ETHICS 208 (1987).  Consider the example of William Beaumont, 
whose studies on the gastric physiology of his subject, Alexis St. Martin, were made 
possible by forcing St. Martin to agree to a lifetime of indentured servitude to Dr. 
Beaumont in exchange for Dr. Beaumont agreeing to treat St. Martin’s life-
threatening gunshot wound.  Id. 
 176 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193. 
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power in the relationship to refuse participation if so inclined, is the 
primary expression of this notion of autonomy.177
The ideal, reflected in the language of the Belmont Report and 
the subsequent federal regulations, was to have a balance between 
these two aspects of research, the complex and driven desire for a 
better world held by researchers and the protection of the subjects of 
their research. The regulatory and ethical communities have assumed 
up to this point that it was this presumed societal benefit that was in 
need of being controlled and kept in balance by vigorously protect-
ing the autonomy of the subjects.  The struggle has been perceived as 
being over the conflict between the search for knowledge and the 
subjects’ individual rights.178  However, beneficence can no longer be 
assumed to be a motivator of researchers.  In fact, it is probably safe 
to assume that beneficence is now the most endangered essential 
element of a great deal of medical research. 
In 1973, the United States Senate held a series of hearings about 
human experimentation.179  The purpose of the hearings was to inves-
tigate allegations of abuse of subjects, and the hearings led directly to 
the creation of the Commission that prepared the Belmont Report.180  
Many of the prominent figures in research at that time testified at 
those hearings and their testimony, in retrospect, gave strong hints as 
to the cultural and legal changes the field was on the cusp of experi-
encing.  For example, Dr. Watson, a noted professor of molecular bi-
ology at Harvard University, spoke about a fiscal crisis in academic sci-
ences due to government cuts in funding of basic science research in 
academic institutions.181  He and others holding similar positions in 
academia spoke of institutions beginning to look for funding from 
 177 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 69, with a particular focus on Chapter 7, 
The Concept of Autonomy, and Chapter 9, Understanding for a discussion of these 
normative concepts. 
 178 “In the end we have to accept the fact that some limits do exist to the search 
for knowledge.”  Paul A. Freund, Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 687 (1965), quoted in PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 7 (1967); see BIOETHICS 
COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 3 (noting that researchers have a serious obligation to 
science that might conflict with their attention to the interests of participants). 
 179 See Senate Hearings, supra note 7. 
 180 See supra Part II. 
 181 Basic science refers to research that is focused on natural processes rather than 
on marketable products.  See, e.g., Univ. of S. Cal., Norris Comprehensive Cancer 
Center, Glossary, http://uscnorriscancer.usc.edu/health/uscnorris/glossary/index. 
html#b (last visited March 2, 2007).  It is often a necessary component of the crea-
tion of new products but occurs far earlier, often when commercial implications are 
unclear.  Id. 
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different sources, with an accompanying shift in the focus of the re-
search.182
To be very clear, the cultural shift described here has been away 
from a research enterprise where success was measured by peer-
reviewed publication in prestigious journals, by achieving tenure and 
the respect of peers, and, perhaps, by the ability to generate grant 
money for one’s institution.  Prior to this shift, most research oc-
curred in an academic setting under the control of the researchers.183  
Furthermore, the accepted values of the scientific community at that 
time included the sharing of information so that it could be chal-
lenged, criticized and eventually further developed by subsequent re-
search.184  The current climate is different.  A deep conflict exists be-
tween the regulatory structure we have in place governing the use of 
human research subjects and the regulatory structure we have in 
place governing the manufacture and sale of pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices.185  The ultimate goal of the regulatory structure in 
place for drug companies is to improve the common good, and in 
furtherance of this goal we have created a regulatory structure that 
gives drug companies rights to control much or all of the data they 
generate using human research subjects.  Even when the data is di-
rectly applicable to safety and effectiveness of a given drug and is 
submitted to a federal agency, the government pledges to keep it se-
cret.186
The idea underlying this secrecy and control is that making drug 
development profitable will encourage more and better drug devel-
opment and so that we, as a society, will experience a net gain in well-
 182 See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 511–12 (testimony of James D. Watson, Pro-
fessor of Molecular Biology, Harvard University). 
 183 See, e.g., BARRY, supra note 73 (giving a detailed account of the medical estab-
lishment in the early 1900s).  
 184 See, e.g., Norman W. Storer, The Internationality of Science and the Nationality of 
Scientists (asserting that scientific knowledge requires an opportunity for competent 
response and that availability to other scientists is an “intrinsic value” of scientific re-
search), in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 174, at 118; see also Karl W. Deutsch, Scien-
tific and Humanistic Knowledge in the Growth of Civilization (“Science itself depends for 
its life on the acceptance of certain fundamental values, such as the value of curiosity 
and learning, the value of truth, the value of sharing knowledge with others [and] 
the value of respect for facts . . . .”), in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 174, at 121. 
 185 See Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006) (discussing theoretical conflicts within the regulations that 
govern health law). 
 186 Under the scheme that regulates drug companies, the FDA has been highly 
protective of pharmaceutical company control of this data.  See generally Pub. Citizen 
Health Research Group v. FDA, 997 F.Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1998); Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Group v. FDA, 539 F.Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1982).   
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being.  The ability to keep information secret will, in theory, increase 
profitability.  If profitability is the driver of progress, this furthers the 
goal of society that a net “good” will occur.  One can, and perhaps 
one should, debate the soundness of this policy and its underlying as-
sumptions.  This Article does not do so.  Here, the policy of utilizing 
profitability to encourage drug development is utilized as a legal and 
historical description of how we function and the choices we have 
made, rather than presenting it as successful or unsuccessful, coher-
ent or deeply flawed. 
The justification of a net societal gain is inapplicable within the 
framework of the regulations of human subject research because of 
the beneficence requirement.  What we end up with are dueling justi-
fications, and hence the resulting conflicting regulatory structures.  
When testing pharmaceuticals, we must satisfy all necessary require-
ments of human subject research, one of which is that the particular 
project must be calculated to generate knowledge for the good of 
mankind.187  And yet our drug regulatory structure allows this very 
same knowledge to be kept secret, to be manipulated and to be dis-
torted in its presentation to society, a direct affront to this first re-
quirement of benefit. 
To state it succinctly, the good of society, writ broadly as it is in 
the justification for our drug regulatory structure, cannot be used to 
justify the suppression of data generated by using human research 
subjects.  This is because one cannot use a broad societal benefit of 
an entire industry to satisfy the legal requirement of a potential bene-
fit within the human research subject analysis. 
In concrete terms, consider the following example: DrugCo is a 
drug company.  It is allowed to consider using Joe Smith as a research 
subject to try a new drug if what it learns from Mr. Smith is likely to 
help us all in the future (thus satisfying the benefit requirement).  
DrugCo uses him, finds out something important and yet suppresses 
the very knowledge the researchers have learned, the hopes of which 
justified using Mr. Smith in the first place, thus depriving other re-
searchers or physicians from knowing the results that were discov-
ered.  In this scenario something violative of human research ethics 
and regulations has occurred.  A necessary element of ethical re-
search on human beings has been compromised, and so the research 
does not satisfy the relevant regulations embodied in the Belmont 
Report.188
 187 Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194. 
 188 Id. 
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Pharmaceutical companies now exercise control over how re-
search is conducted in academic institutions to a degree that was un-
heard of in the 1970s,189 effectively “load[ing] the dice to make sure 
their drugs look good.”190  Trials performed or funded by drug com-
panies to prove the safety and efficacy of their products “can be 
rigged in a dozen ways, and it happens all the time” in order to make 
the results appear more positive than they might otherwise seem.191  
Beginning in the 1980s, academic researchers began to see them-
selves as partners of the drug industry, and a measurable pro-industry 
bias began to appear in published medical research.192  The decision 
as to whether to publish data or conclusions derived from studies is 
often controlled by the drug companies.193  Researchers do not neces-
sarily have to internalize a pro-industry bias, as they are often bound 
by contracts that give the sponsor of the study the right to control 
publication and all other forms of dissemination of the data derived 
from the study.194  As will be illustrated by the SSRI case study in Part 
IV, this lack of control over the findings of a study can present signifi-
cant ethical problems for researchers but, even given those known 
problems, confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements are still com-
monplace between the people conducting the research and the spon-
soring drug or device manufacturer whose product is being tested.195  
It is particularly enlightening for purposes of describing the current 
 189 Krimsky, supra note 76, at 70–74. 
 190 ANGELL, supra note 2, at xviii.  Dr. Angell recently stepped down as editor of 
the New England Journal of Medicine, where she worked for thirty years.  The New 
England Journal of Medicine, along with the Lancet and the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, is one of the most prestigious medical journals in the world to-
day.  For an example of a study design that serves to accomplish this type of goal, 
consider events related to the Pfizer drug trials conducted in Nigeria, where Pfizer 
was alleged to have used purposefully low doses of the accepted treatment for men-
ingitis in children to enhance the comparative performance of their own drug, which 
was the subject of the trial.  See AURORA PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL 
RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2005). 
 191 ANGELL, supra note 2, at 95. 
 192 See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454–63 (2003) (presenting a 
statistical analysis of the impact of drug company sponsorship of studies and showing 
a persistent and large increase in the number of pro-industry outcomes when the 
studies are financed by drug companies); see also ANGELL, supra note 2, at 8. 
 193 Bekelman, supra note 192, at 463. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Guidelines promulgated by the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors (ICMJE) forbid these agreements, but a study published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine in October 2002 concluded that these guidelines were not being 
followed, and articles that fail to follow them were still being published.  See K.A. 
Schulman et al., A National Survey of Provisions in Clinical-Trial Agreements between Medi-
cal Schools and Industry Sponsors, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1335, 1339 (2002). 
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culture that researchers have reported feeling powerless in negotia-
tions with corporate sponsors regarding confidentiality and publica-
tion rights even though the contracts may be in direct defiance of 
journal publication guidelines.196  The academic institutions where 
many of these researchers work have ceded levels of control over 
their studies to the sponsors to a degree that has prompted much 
criticism.197  Many of the studies now conducted are done merely to 
satisfy regulatory requirements, rather than for the purpose of gener-
ating information deemed relevant by the researcher, making the de-
sirable outcome easy to determine in advance and its success finan-
cially critical to the study sponsor.198
A series of legislative and regulatory actions have helped create 
the incentives for the problematic changes described above.  The 
primary piece of legislation responsible for cementing attitudes re-
garding control of data is FOIA,199 as interpreted by the FDA to pro-
tect safety and efficacy data of drug companies from disclosure to the 
public.200  The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,201 the Bayh-Dole Act,202 
and the various legislative schemes designed to increase and encour-
age drug testing on children203 have also been important. 
A.  Freedom of Information Act 
Starting in 1962, the FDA’s mandate from Congress required 
applicants who sought FDA approval for marketing of pharmaceuti-
cals to show both safety and effectiveness of those drugs, which in 
turn required the use of drug trials on human subjects to generate 
 196 Id. 
 197 ANGELL, supra note 2, at 103; see also Krimsky, supra note 76, at 61. 
 198 This raises the question as to whether it is ever appropriate to use human re-
search subjects for purposes of regulatory approval.  It may very well turn out to be 
appropriate, but the work of determining this has not yet been done.  This is one of 
numerous analytical problems that need to be examined in light of a newly invigo-
rated concept of beneficence. 
 199 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 200 The author would like to thank Dr. Ruth Faden for her helpful insights regard-
ing the FOIA that she gave when this article was presented in an earlier form in Bal-
timore in 2005. 
 201 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and  35 
U.S.C.). 
 202 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 
200–212 (2000). 
 203 See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 
1408 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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the data.204  To support drug applications, drug companies submit 
large amounts of data to the FDA consisting of “thousands of pages of 
proprietary data, including both trade secrets and confidential busi-
ness statistical data.”205  Some contend that the FDA “possesses among 
its routinely collected files some of the most sensitive nonmilitary 
data in the whole universe of federal records.”206  The drug industry 
has gone to great lengths to prove the financial competitive value of 
its safety and efficacy data contained in these files, including sponsor-
ing a number of studies by economists on this topic.207  The financial 
value of the secrecy of this data has not been seriously questioned by 
any commentators. 
The FDA has consistently committed to keeping this data secret.  
When FOIA was written in the 1970s, the goal was to increase citizen 
access to government process.208  There are a series of exceptions to 
what the government is required to release in response to a FOIA re-
quest.209  The exception relevant here is for non-governmental, pri-
vate sector trade secrets.210  The FDA has determined that safety and 
efficacy data submitted by drug companies in support of applications 
before the FDA will be protected from disclosure in response to FOIA 
requests under the trade secret exemption.211  This decision was the 
subject of debate when it was made in the early 1970s and is still sub-
ject to criticism.212  Congress did not specifically include safety and ef-
ficacy data in the trade secret exemption, but it has also not acted to 
change the FDA’s interpretation since it was published in the Federal 
Register, despite its clear power to do so. 
The FDA has received tens of thousands of FOIA requests from 
corporations for other corporations’ filings.213  “Perhaps 85 percent 
 204 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2602(6) (2000); ANGELL, supra note 
2, at 34. 
 205 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 14:92 (3d ed. 2000). 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id.  For example, Study to Assess Impacts of Releasing Safety and Effectiveness Data on 
the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Incentives to Invest in and Conduct Research and Development 
Programs, was conducted by Pracon, Inc. and submitted to the FDA in 1978.  Id. § 
14:92 n.6. 
 208 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). 
 209 Id. § 552(b). 
 210 Id. § 552(b)(4). 
 211 Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,603 (Dec. 24, 1974) (codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 90, 121, 135, 146, 312, 314, 431, 601, 720, and 730). 
 212 See, e.g., FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14; Letter from Donald Kennedy, 
Commissioner, FDA, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senate (May 5, 1978) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Kennedy Letter]. 
 213 O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:92. 
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of the FDA’s 30,000 annual FOIA requests at the height of its pre-
[I]nternet FOIA period had come from businesses seeking other 
firms’ reports.”214  The corporate identity of the information seekers 
strongly supports a conclusion that there is a commercial motivation 
to these requests.  This, coupled with the expressed concerns of the 
drug manufacturers whose data is at risk, appears to have influenced 
agency response, taking the position that it needs to protect the fi-
nancial interests of the industry it regulates from those who would 
unfairly benefit from others’ work product.215
It is quite simple to show that FOIA releases of safety and efficacy 
data can create a commercial harm for drug companies, as has been 
done in a number of studies.  To quote from one of the early studies 
conducted to assess this potential harm: 
[S]afety and efficacy data that is submitted to the FDA as part of a 
drug approval process serves to confirm or refute scientific hy-
potheses about class[es] of drugs—a process of information that 
is extremely valuable for the second or subsequent research firms, 
which would not need to look at those particular drug entities [to 
establish the information already proven].  If the data from FDA 
files were disclosed, there would be a change in the research pat-
tern of [the drug industry,] arguably worsening the burdens on 
United States pharmaceutical innovation.216
In a world committed to creating financial incentives for drug 
companies, the cost of releasing the data is clear.217  It will serve to 
diminish the financial incentives for drug companies by reducing 
their profitability. 
There are other costs to a drug company from releasing safety 
and efficacy data.  Data is vulnerable to manipulation in how it is pre-
sented and in the results it claims to prove.  If other scientists are 
given access to this same data, they can analyze and criticize the tri-
 214 Id. § 10:1. 
 215 See WILLIAM L. CASEY, JR. ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 169 (1983) (giving an in-depth discussion of these 
concerns from a drug company perspective). 
 216 O’REILLY, supra note 205.  This analysis is derived from a study referred to as 
the most comprehensive analysis of the impacts of FOIA on the pharmaceutical in-
dustry in the 1980s, when the issue was still being hotly debated.  CASEY, JR. ET AL., su-
pra note 215. 
 217 For an example of federal court acceptance of the validity of this economic 
analysis, see Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc., v. U.S., 836 F.2d 135, 138–41 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(noting that the economics of drug research tend to discourage full test data dis-
semination).  See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(finding that the submitter of test data to the FDA continues to have a reasonable 
expectation that the law and regulations will continue to protect commercial value of 
the test data). 
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als.218  Drug companies risk being challenged on the design of the 
study, the interpretations of study results, and the way negative trial 
events are recorded.  These are the types of costly events that oc-
curred with the FDA’s analysis of SSRIs in a pediatric population, as 
discussed in Part IV.  It is not difficult to surmise that the risk to drug 
company interests increases if other scientists outside of government 
employment are given access to the same quality of information 
available to the FDA.  Claims of safety or efficacy are vulnerable to be-
ing refuted with very little financial or time investment on the part of 
those who would challenge them.  A further risk is that with access to 
preliminary data, it becomes easier to design studies that compare 
the effectiveness of one treatment with another, or with a series of 
others.  Drug companies under the current regulatory system do not 
have to prove that a new product performs better than current prod-
ucts; it merely must be proven to outperform a placebo.219  Thus, a 
new drug that either performs significantly worse than those cur-
rently on the market or that can offer only a minor improvement 
with a significant cost increase can be approved and marketed.  Any 
heightened exposure to comparative cost-benefit data that could in-
fluence patients, doctors, and, perhaps more importantly, third-party 
payers, is a significant financial risk for drug companies. 
The analysis of the impact of FDA protection of FOIA disclo-
sures of safety and efficacy data is strikingly different when analyzed 
from the perspective of human-research-subject regulation.  The 
fundamental requirement of a benefit to be derived from research on 
human subjects brings with it a need to view structures that materially 
lessen these benefits with some concern.  One clear goal of the hu-
man-research-subject regulations in the United States should be to 
reduce the number of persons who will be subjects of research to the 
smallest number possible to accomplish the identified benefit, thus 
reducing the overall risk of any given project and ensuring that no 
one person is sacrificing himself unnecessarily.  A second goal should 
be to have the benefit be as robust as possible and to have the ac-
complishments of any given study resonate as broadly as possible in 
terms of what they add to the knowledge base of humankind.  Here, 
in the FOIA exception debate, we have a series of studies and asser-
tions that proving the FDA’s protection of the safety and efficacy data 
of drug companies will result in repetitive studies being conducted, 
because one company will not be able to build on what another com-
 218 Krimsky, supra note 76, at 63. 
 219 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2006). 
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pany has already proven.220  Thus, this secrecy makes it highly likely 
that more people will be used as research subjects in situations where 
their participation is difficult, if not impossible, to justify within the 
scheme envisioned by the current human research subject regula-
tions.  We also know from this same debate that the scientific com-
munity as a whole will not move forward as quickly as it could if it 
were given full access to this information, thus minimizing the poten-
tial benefit of the knowledge gained from any given study. 
Viewed from the perspective of human research subject ethics 
and regulations, the drug industry arguments presented in defense of 
FOIA exemptions show an industry that early on lost sight of its obli-
gations as a participant in, and beneficiary of, research on human 
subjects.  It also shows a deep and persistent conflict between protect-
ing competitive advantage and maximizing societal benefit.221
The FDA, responding to the concerns of the drug companies 
and recognizing the financial value of the information it received 
from them, agreed to extend trade secret protection to safety and ef-
ficacy data.222  However, that agreement did not come from a unified 
FDA.  While the regulatory ramifications of a reduction in benefit de-
rived from a study were not perceived by any of the commentators in 
terms of human research subject regulations, the actual reduction of 
societal benefit itself was a cause of tremendous concern.223  A letter 
written by Dr. Donald Kennedy while he was the Commissioner of the 
FDA in 1978 shows his concerns regarding the impact of secrecy in 
this area.224  The letter, written to United States Senator Edward Ken-
nedy, argues for the release of safety and effectiveness data submitted 
to it by drug companies.225  He takes the position that government 
decisions should, whenever possible, be based on publicly available 
 220 O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:92 n.6. 
 221 The argument that data suppression minimizes societal benefit is fairly 
straightforward as regards the benefit that can accrue from an individual research 
project, but the arguments presented in this Article about the impact of suppression 
on the scientific community as a whole tend to support the argument that benefit, 
across the society, is being negatively impacted by this phenomenom. 
 222 See O’REILLY, supra note 205. 
 223 This is evidenced by several documents. See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 
15l; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 13; Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
 224 Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.  Donald Kennedy has a Ph.D. in biology.  In 
light of this Article’s assertion that a change in culture has led to a reduction of data 
dissemination, it is interesting to read the perspective of Dr. Kennedy, a scientist who 
was trained at Harvard in the earlier culture, on the risks he perceived from this FDA 
policy. 
 225 Id. 
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information.226  More relevant to this point, he refers to peer review 
and the publication of scientific information as the system “at the 
heart of the scientific process . . . a fundamental requirement of sci-
ence that hypotheses and conclusions of one scientist be subjected to 
public examination, criticism, and debate by other scientists before 
their validity is accepted.”227  Furthermore, he wrote, “secrecy is anti-
thetical to good science, . . . [and] release of safety and efficacy data 
would promote the spread and growth of scientific knowledge.”228
Dr. Kennedy quotes from a presidential Scientific Advisory 
Committee Report from 1973, written by a committee appointed by 
the Nixon administration, stating that “[n]ot allowing the academic 
research community access to the retained results of safety testing is 
believed to have adversely affected progress in the understanding of 
the presence or absence of unfortunate effects of chemicals on peo-
ple.”229  He then writes, “[i]n assessing the impact of release of the 
data on drug innovation, it is important to consider that release of 
data would increase general knowledge, reduce error and waste, and 
thereby reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of drug re-
search.”230  Given that the 
FDA is one of the largest repositories of drug information in the 
world . . . on matters such as pharmacokinetics, estimation of 
human risks from animal studies, potential new uses for older 
drugs, and techniques to reduce human risk and increase the sci-
entific validity of drug testing, information of immense value to 
humanity may be locked away in the agency’s files . . . .  Release of 
safety and effectiveness data would also encourage the improved 
design and more careful execution of studies.231
Furthermore, Dr. Kennedy remarked that “[t]he opportunity for re-
view by scientists outside the agency will provide a valuable additional 
incentive for drug sponsors to produce the best and most reliable 
data.”232
In 1977, Norman Dorsen headed a government-appointed panel 
on drug regulations233 that commented on the possible impact of this 
type of secrecy.  Dr. Kennedy refers to that panel’s conclusions in his 
letter, stating that he has ethical concerns about “routinely treating as 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id.; see also Krimsky, supra note 76. 
 229 Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
642 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:605 
 
‘proprietary’ research involving human subjects,” at least partially due 
to concerns that this secrecy may diminish the subjects’ contributions 
to humanity.234
Both Dr. Kennedy and Mr. Dorsen recognized an ethical prob-
lem in keeping safety and efficacy data secret, but neither of them 
saw the direct relationship between this problem and the regulatory 
requirements of research on human subjects.235  Under the Belmont 
Report, there is a legal mandate that this “contribution to humanity” 
be respected and not unduly minimized.236  In effect, it is possible for 
the suppression or manipulation of data derived from these studies to 
undermine the benefits of the study initially presented to the IRB for 
approval under the guise of prospectively contributing to human-
kind.  The drug companies lost sight of the underlying ethical bal-
ance between benefit and respect for persons that led to the U.S. 
regulations, instead focusing entirely on the impact of any data dis-
closure on their financial incentives to conduct business.  An exam-
ple of this drug industry stance is also in Dr. Kennedy’s letter.237  Prior 
to the creation of the relatively recent regulatory structure that gov-
erns generic drugs,238 drug companies holding the original patents to 
substances were faced with the fact that generic drug manufacturers 
could profit from their own work on these substances once the origi-
nal patent expired.  Before Dr. Kennedy wrote his letter, drug com-
pany representatives testified before Congress on this issue.  Robert 
Clark, a drug company industry representative, testified that he 
wanted to require generic drug manufacturers to repeat all of the 
safety and efficacy studies of the original patent holder, with the goal 
of repetitive testing creating a barrier to the generic drug companies’ 
respective entries into the marketplace.239  Dr. Kennedy challenged 
this notion of repetitive testing for purposes of creating a barrier to 
entry in his letter to Senator Kennedy as ethically unacceptable, but 
he did not go into detail as to why this is so.240  This would be ethically 
 234 Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
 235 This may be based on the timing of the FOIA debate, which occurred soon af-
ter the drafting of the Belmont Report and early in the development of the regula-
tions.  The ethical concerns were recognized, but it was perhaps not yet clear as to 
their legal status. 
 236 See Belmont Report, supra note 8; see also supra Part II. 
 237 Kennedy letter, supra note 212. 
 238 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 and  35 U.S.C.). 
 239 See Senate Hearings, supra note 7. 
 240 See Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
2008] REINVIGORATING THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT 643 
 
questionable on numerous levels.  The human beings who volun-
teered for the first tests would suffer a diminishment of the benefit 
for which they sacrificed.  As for new subjects, it exposes them to the 
risks of being a test subject with no hope for the possibility of gain for 
humankind; a subject of a test with no scientific rationale to justify it 
at all.  The entire justification of using the second round of human 
subjects is to protect economic incentives for drug companies.  This is 
unacceptable under the federal regulations for human research sub-
jects detailed above.241  What is interesting is how this statement of 
the drug company executive is made with no apparent awareness of 
the implications for human research subjects, a blindness that con-
tinues to this day. 
The Dorsen Panel was created on February 21, 1975 to assess 
drug regulations and the functioning of the FDA.242  It was created by 
Caspar Weinberger, then the Secretary of HEW, in response to Sen-
ate subcommittee hearings which had raised questions about the 
FDA’s process of reviewing new drugs.243
The Dorsen Panel reported to the Secretary of HEW and had no 
powers or responsibilities other than preparing its reports.244  Among 
other issues, it examined whether FOIA should protect safety and ef-
ficacy data submitted to the FDA as trade secrets and discussed this in 
both an interim report issued in November 1976 and the final panel 
report issued in May 1977.245  The panel’s reports were quite critical 
of suppression of data, but also failed to connect the two relevant 
regulatory schemes—that of the FDA’s drug approval process and the 
other used for the regulation of research on human subjects.  The in-
terim report states that “[c]urrent trade secrets policy conflicts with 
fundamental moral principles that human beings not be subjected to 
wasteful new drug testing and that scientific knowledge collected at 
public risk be publicly disclosed.”246  Furthermore: 
 241 See supra Part II. 
 242 This panel is quite similar to the more recent Institute of Medicine Panel that 
issued its report on the FDA in September of 2006.  See COMMITTEE ON THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: 
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 
2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11750. 
 243 FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
 244 Id.  Contrasting this with the power of the Commission provides further evi-
dence of the unusual scope of the Commission’s brief. 
 245 Together, the different interim reports and the final report are referred to as 
the Dorsen Report and were cited to in many of the discussions in the late 1970s and 
1980s about the role of the FDA in general.  See generally INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, su-
pra note 14; FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
 246 INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14, at D1. 
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[F]ailure to release . . . [safety and effectiveness] data tends to en-
courage wasteful and unjustifiable duplicative testing in humans.  
The failure also interferes withthe free exchange of scientific 
knowledge . . . . The sole justification for this trade secrets policy 
is that it may protect the market position, and thus the incentive 
to innovate, of companies that invest in research and develop-
ment of new drugs.247
The Dorsen Panel examined the policy debate that took place in 
Congress prior to the passage of FOIA.248  The debate in Congress 
over trade secret protection apparently included problems regarding 
safety and efficacy information.  As the panel stated, “[p]erhaps the 
most controversial question in formulating this policy concerned the 
status of safety and efficacy test data.”249
The report noted that in recent years (that is, recent relative to 
1976) the FDA had interpreted the trade secret exemption to extend 
protection to animal and human test data.250  The Dorsen Final Re-
port examined the FDA process as of 1977 and criticized it for its lack 
of openness in reviewing drug applications.251  One criticism was that 
the system was essentially closed to public review and participation.252  
The lack of openness stemmed primarily from the FDA’s trade secret 
protections that prohibited the FDA from disclosing most scientific 
data held by it and thus this trade secret protection prevented the 
FDA from releasing to the public information underlying its deci-
sions.253  The committee was concerned about “suppression of impor-
tant scientific information about new drugs” and wanted Congress to 
see how to encourage research and development without the sup-
 247 Id. 
 248 See id. 
 249 Id.  For the language of the regulations discussed in the Dorsen Report, see 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 250 See Safety and Effectiveness Data for New Drugs and New Animal Drugs, 39 
Fed. Reg. 44,601 (Dec. 24, 1974); Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 9, 
128–29 (May 5, 1972).  For purposes of the debate, the FDA defined safety and effec-
tiveness data as “all studies and tests of a drug on animals and humans and all studies 
and tests on the drug for identity, stability, purity, potency and bioavailability.”  See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 314.14(i), 514.11(h), 4.111(e) (1976).  This definition treats data that are 
very different from one another in terms of the moral and regulatory requirements 
imposed on them as though they were the same.  Data derived from human subjects, 
versus animal studies or studies on the substance itself will have different regulatory 
schemes governing those being studied.  This Article argues that the fact that the 
data is derived from human beings imposes a beneficence requirement upon it that 
must be supported by the treatment of that data subsequent to its development.  
Data not derived from humans has a different legal status. 
 251 See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
 252 Id. at 2. 
 253 Id. at 33. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
2008] REINVIGORATING THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT 645 
 
pression.254  The committee called for “closer review of drug testing to 
ensure that studies are not misdirected, that human test subjects are 
not exposed to undue safety risks, that important drug applications 
are not neglected, and that data submitted by drug sponsors are nei-
ther fraudulent nor misleading.”255  The Dorsen Panel observed that 
“clinical testing of new drugs is defensible only if it offers the possibil-
ity of social benefits, [and that] incomplete or inaccurate reporting 
of clinical data raises serious questions about the ethics of such test-
ing.”256
The FDA’s stated justification for protecting the confidentiality 
of this data was based entirely on a financial incentive theory of drug 
development.257
The public is dependant upon private pharmaceutical manufac-
turers for development of drugs.  In some instances [the drug or 
substance being tested] may not be patented.  If a manufacturer’s 
safety and effectiveness data are to be released upon request, thus 
permitting “me-too” drugs to be marketed immediately, it is en-
tirely possible that the incentive for private pharmaceutical re-
search will be adversely affected.258
The drug industry consistently expressed its concerns that the 
FDA needed to make a firm commitment to protecting data disclosed 
to it in order to prevent a competitive harm from occurring due to a 
broad societal increase in knowledge, which was clearly perceived as a 
negative outcome.  Once the information became broadly available, 
it would lose proprietary value to the drug company.259
The Dorsen Panel saw this trade secret protection as doing harm 
to scientific progress, undermining FDA credibility in decision-
making and greatly reducing the benefit that could be achieved from 
the studies that had been conducted.260  In light of its commitment to 
keeping information confidential, the FDA must publicly justify its 
decisions regarding drug applications without being able to explicitly 
refer to the data upon which the decisions are based.  This approach 
presents a problem of both credibility and accountability that has not 
yet been resolved; furthermore, the FDA is consistently deprived of 
 254 Id. at 2. 
 255 Id. at 6. 
 256 Id. at 8. 
 257 FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
 258 Id. at 34 (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1974)). 
 259 See CASEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 215, at 169. 
 260 FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
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valuable opinions and challenges from other scientists and the pub-
lic, increasing the risk of arbitrary or irrational decisions.261
The Dorsen Panel specifically addressed implications of this pol-
icy for human research subjects: “[W]ithout access to supporting 
data, informed public debate on controversial decisions and on 
broad questions such as the ethics of human testing becomes impos-
sible.”262  The Dorsen Panel condemned keeping scientific research 
hidden from the public view because it 
often forces pharmaceutical companies to engage in testing which 
duplicates work already performed by other companies.  Because 
duplicative testing has little social value, the ethics of such testing 
are always questionable.  In fact, duplicative testing might lead to 
deaths or illnesses which could have been avoided had the inves-
tigator been familiar with another firm’s findings.263
The Dorsen Panel further added that the trade secrets policy of the 
FDA interfered with the free exchange of scientific knowledge.264  Ar-
guably, this free exchange of information is an intimate part of what 
makes research on human subjects proper, as it adds so much to the 
value of what is learned.  Scientists will not be given access to sup-
pressed data, thus hampering their work by not giving them access to 
“scientific advances which have a bearing on their own work.”265  
“One of the most troublesome aspects of  [the system] is that the FDA 
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of indus-
try-generated data” without it being subject to the challenges that 
other scientists might raise.266
The submission of inaccurate or misleading data also poses a 
problem relating to the ethics of human testing.  Although the 
testing of new drugs on human volunteers subjects them to un-
known risks for unknown benefits, those experiments ordinarily 
are justified on the ground that they may produce larger social 
gains.  When test results do not accurately reflect the outcome of 
clinical trials, human test subjects will have been exposed to the 
risks of an experimental drug without countervailing benefit.267
The Dorsen Report, in the end, disagreed with the FDA’s con-
clusion that trade secret law mandated the position the FDA took re-
 261 The case study presented in Part IV is a good example of these concerns bear-
ing fruit. 
 262 FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 35. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 35. 
 265 Id. at 36. 
 266 Id. at 83. 
 267 Id. 
FOX_FINAL 4/11/2008  8:02:10 AM 
2008] REINVIGORATING THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT 647 
 
garding safety and efficacy data and believed that the FDA could le-
gally release this type of data in response to FOIA requests.268  It 
stated that it would also be beneficial for the FDA to do so.269  The 
Dorsen Report also called for Congress to address the problem di-
rectly since the FDA had reached a contrary decision in its stated 
policies.270  That change has not yet occurred, and therefore FDA 
regulations still protect drug companies from disclosure of data un-
der FOIA.  The Dorsen Panel concluded that the present safeguards 
in the system (those present in 1977 and still roughly the same today) 
were not enough to prevent bias in how data was presented to the 
FDA, based on a desire by drug companies for a commercially suc-
cessful product.271
The FDA failed to properly take into account the impact of its 
regulatory decision concerning FOIA release of drug company data 
on the regulations governing human subject research.  This does not 
mean that the duty to comply with the human research subject regu-
lations is an onus upon the FDA.  It still rests quite firmly with those 
who are proposing to conduct a study.  The FDA stance is relevant 
because it permits the drug companies to use the data they generate 
on human subjects to gain government approval of a product and yet 
still fail to satisfy the benefit requirement of the human research 
regulations.  A countervailing pressure to be forthcoming and open 
that could have been generated by the need to satisfy FDA regula-
tions is not present.  The debate regarding the FDA’s policy decision 
is also relevant because those who have addressed it, including Dr. 
Kennedy and the Dorsen Panel, have done an excellent job of detail-
ing many of the wrongs that are caused by this FOIA policy.272  The 
failure of the analysis in both the letter from Dr. Kennedy and the 
Dorsen Panel reports273 was a lack of understanding of the implica-
tions of the beneficence requirement of the human subject regula-
tions.  Thirty years later, this Article seeks to rectify that omission. 
 268 FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 85. 
 272 See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14; Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
 273 This analysis was echoed in a subsequent article in the Harvard Law Review, co-
authored by a lead author of the Dorsen Report.  See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 
13. 
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B. The Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts 
The Bayh-Dole Act274 reflected changes in the culture of research 
while also radically accelerating the speed and depth of the changes 
that occurred.  This Act made it possible for research that was con-
ducted with federal funds to be used for the profit of those conduct-
ing it, either by exploiting the technology themselves or by licensing 
it to another firm.275  The Act allows companies to gain a proprietary 
interest in drugs and technologies that in the past were controlled by 
the federal government.276  The Bayh-Dole Act specifically changed 
prior federal laws that explicitly called for this information to be 
made public.277  The stated rationale for this change was that for-
profit business would serve to bring the fruit of technological ad-
vances to the public more quickly and efficiently than occurred when 
information was freely available to all who might seek to utilize it.278  
The legislation seeks to “promote the commercialization and public 
availability of [these] inventions.”279  The government maintains 
rights in what is covered under the Act, but primarily for purposes of 
ensuring that the full market potential is actually pursued.280  Con-
gress also enacted a confidentiality provision in the Act that allows 
the relevant federal agency to choose to keep any information related 
to specific inventions confidential so that the interested private par-
ties have time to pursue a patent.281
Consider the impact this could have on an academic research in-
stitution, and, furthermore, on the large drug companies.  First, the 
researcher is given the option of pursuing research under federal 
grants, with the added possibility of becoming wealthy due to exclu-
 274 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 
200–212 (2000). 
 275 See id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 For example, the explicitly changes the laws governing the Department of Ag-
riculture, specifically, 7 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (2000), which governed research grants and 
contracts to conduct research and concluded, prior to Bayh-Dole, that “[a]ny con-
tract made pursuant to this section shall contain requirements making the result of 
such research and investigations available to the public by such means as the Secre-
tary of Agriculture shall determine.”  This type of language was consistent across fed-
eral agencies prior to the Bayh-Dole Act.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research 
and Private Development, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 n.2 (1996). 
 278 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. § 203.  This section of the Act discusses what are known as “March-In 
Rights.”   
 281 See id. § 205. 
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sive rights in whatever marketable advances might be discovered.282  
This introduces a new set of motivations into the researcher’s deci-
sion-making that was entirely absent when the federal government 
maintained the rights to these results.  Failure to prove that a drug or 
device works well presents a possibility of financial loss to the re-
searcher.  Given the amount of money that is usually involved in 
bringing a drug or device to market, most researchers license these 
products to large drug companies.283  Thus, the goals of the research-
ers and the drug companies can easily become aligned due to consis-
tent financial pressures on both of them.  Furthermore, the drug 
companies no longer have the same motivation to invest in new tech-
nologies, given that under Bayh-Dole, it is far less risky to allow the 
federal government to finance the development of new technologies 
and drugs that the drug companies will then take through the ap-
proval process and market. 
Bayh-Dole then has served to remove much data that was derived 
through the use of human research subjects from the public domain, 
resulting in what presumably is a predictable subsequent reduction in 
scientific benefit from secrecy of data, which has already been de-
scribed in some detail in this Article.  Furthermore, the Act creates 
financial incentives for researchers to distort and manipulate data 
such that they and their institutions can profit from the resulting 
product’s profitability.  Finally, Bayh-Doyle continues the research in-
stitutions’ cultural shift away from pursuing a social benefit, as origi-
nally conceived, and satisfaction from scientific results of research 
that increase the knowledge of human kind toward a different policy 
concept of benefit.  This benefit is measured by the success of the 
drug companies, as drug company profitability and social good are 
conflated into one measurement. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was created primarily for the 
purpose of making it possible for generic drugs to be approved by the 
FDA without requiring the same level of testing to show proof of 
 282 See id. § 203.  Under the March-In Rights retained by the federal government, 
if the researcher decides to forgo pursuing profit, the rights of that researcher can 
simply be taken away and passed to someone the government believes will pursue it 
more vigorously.  See id. 
 283 PhRMA estimates that it costs about $800 million to bring a drug to market.  
PHARMA PROFILE, supra note 5, at 10 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
NIH, SUMMARY OF THE FY2007 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET (2006), http://www.nih.gov/ 
news/budget/FY2006presbudget.pdf). 
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safety and efficacy that the non-generic drug required.284  A generic 
in this instance is substantially the same as a substance that has al-
ready been approved by the FDA, and by creating a scheme that pri-
marily required proof that the generic substance did not differ sub-
stantially from the older, already approved substance, the generic 
could be brought to market more efficiently.285  The Act also gave in-
creased exclusivity rights to the manufacturers of the original drugs 
as a trade-off.286  The generics cannot be brought to market for a sub-
stantial period of time, allowing the original marketer time to profit 
from its monopoly.287
One would think that this law could have served to make it pos-
sible for drug companies to be open about the data they controlled, 
since their rights were both more completely protected with the ex-
tension of exclusivity and were more concretely limited, given the ex-
plicit approval of bringing generic drugs to market that piggy-back on 
drug-company approvals already conducted by the FDA.  This has not 
occurred.  What did happen is that, during the debate about generics 
(which is still ongoing), the drug companies have maintained that 
the data is theirs, developed for their own profit, and that generics 
should have to conduct the research again themselves.288  This is par-
ticularly interesting in light of the fact that the source of much of the 
original inventions being debated is government-funded research, 
later licensed to the drug companies for exploitation under Bayh-
Dole.289
The reasons public disclosure of this information tends to be fi-
nancially costly to the drug companies are remarkably similar to the 
reasons this Article argues they need to be made public.  The motiva-
tion for the call for disclosure is to reassert the original, and still 
binding, ethical legal structure that was built around the complex is-
sue of how to use human beings as research subjects.  The incentive 
structure that has developed since the 1970s for drug companies was 
misinformed and poorly planned in light of drug company depend-
ency on human research subjects.  It cannot coexist with human re-
search subject regulations as they now stand.  The parties involved, 
 284 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and  35 
U.S.C.). 
 285 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
 286 See id. 
 287 See id. 
 288 See Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. 
 289 See ANGELL, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the amount of new technology being 
generated by drug companies themselves). 
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from government agencies to the drug companies themselves, should 
have recognized this flaw.  With disclosure of study results, innovation 
would move more quickly, basic research would not need to be re-
peated, and people could “free ride” on the work done by others, a 
term used in a pejorative way in the economic studies prepared by 
the drug industry290 though this is exactly what a free exchange of sci-
entific information is meant to accomplish. The current treatment of 
safety and efficacy data appears to slow the rate of learning and de-
velopment at a society-wide level in order to, in theory, encourage it 
on an individual company’s part.  If we could, indeed, free-ride on 
one company’s development of information from the test data it con-
trols and thus move more quickly toward an improved drug or away 
from a faulty one, this would seem to be an ideal achievement from 
the perspective of a risk-benefit analysis of a study, adding signifi-
cantly to the possible benefits that could be derived.  Clearly, that is 
not the goal of current research culture. 
IV. CASE STUDY OF SSRIS IN A PEDIATRIC POPULATION 
Current events have presented case studies that show the risk of 
corporate suppression of important data derived from volunteer re-
search subjects is more than a theoretical concern.291  The primary 
case examined here is the suppression of data concerning the danger 
and lack of efficacy associated with children’s antidepressants.  This 
information started to become public knowledge in the summer of 
2003 when GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo) applied for British approval for 
the use of Paxil, an SSRI, in a pediatric population.292  The SSRI class 
also includes Prozac and other commonly prescribed anti-
depressants.293  Within two weeks of receiving the application, Medi-
cines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the Brit-
ish regulatory agency charged with reviewing these applications, con-
traindicated the use of Paxil in patients under the age of eighteen.294  
 290 See, e.g., O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:93.  This book, written for FOIA practi-
tioners, is solely concerned with the financial costs to enterprise from inappropriate 
FOIA disclosures and offers a valuable perspective on the industry concerns. 
 291 Berenson, supra note 22. 
 292 See FDA’s Role in Protecting Public Health: Examining FDA’s Review of Safety & Effi-
cacy Concerns in Anti-Depressant Use by Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 4–5 (2004) 
[hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman of House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce). 
 293 More than ten million children a year are prescribed antidepressants, as of 
2004.  Id. at 6. 
 294 This was first reported in the press in June 2003.  See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, Mood 
Drug Seroxat Banned for Under 18s, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 11, 2003, available at http:// 
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In December 2003, MHRA contraindicated all antidepressants, ex-
cept for Prozac, for children, due to an increase in suicidal behaviors 
combined with failure to show efficacy.295  This, in turn, prompted a 
number of articles in the popular press about the possible dangers of 
these drugs.296  In the United States, Congress convened hearings on 
this subject in the fall of 2004 calling for the FDA to explain how 
these drugs were on the market and freely available to the pediatric 
population in the U.S., given the dangers that the studies had dis-
closed.297
It is important to note here that these studies on children were 
conducted primarily as a result of widespread concern over the lack 
of available data about how drugs work in children.298  For decades, 
children have been perceived as a vulnerable population that needs 
to be protected from exploitation, and so have been prevented from 
participating in most drug trials as subjects.299  This led to limited sci-
entific understanding of how drugs are metabolized by children’s 
bodies, which in turn led to a series of policy decisions meant to en-
courage an ethical and appropriate increase in the use of children as 
research subjects.300  The goal was to begin to fill in what science 
knows little about: how drugs work in children.301
We have learned much about the drug industry’s behavior since 
MHRA made its initial finding against Glaxo’s application in 2003.  
This Part describes how there have been numerous studies that sup-
port a finding of increased suicidal thoughts among children, and 
probably adults, when using these antidepressants, and that these 
studies began to generate this information at least as long ago as 
1996.302  The drug companies that controlled this data did not make 
www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,974901,00.html.  The use of the word 
“contraindicated” has a slightly different meaning in England than it does in the 
United States.  In England it is not a ban on prescribing the substance but is, instead, 
a harsh warning as to the risks of doing so.  In the United States it is highly unusual 
for a physician to prescribe a substance that has been “contraindicated” by the FDA 
as a treatment, and thus the impact of such a communication is effectively a ban.  Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 See, e.g., Erica Goode, British Ignite a Debate on Drugs and Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2003, at F1. 
 297 See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 490. 
 298 See, e.g., Connie Lenz, Prescribing a Legislative Response: Educators, Physicians, and 
Psychotropic Medication for Children, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 72 (2005). 
 299 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 527–32. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, The Pediatric Gap: Why Have Most Medications Never 
Been Properly Tested on Kids?, NEW YORKER,  Jan. 10, 2005, at 32. 
 302 See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 490 (citing Letter from James F. Knudsen, 
FDA, to Martha A. Brumfield, Senior Associate Director, Pfizer, Inc.) (“We note that 
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it public, and these same companies went to great efforts to make 
sure no one else who also had access to the information went public 
with it.303  This failure to be forthcoming about these studies caused 
at least two distinct problems.  First, it prevented physicians and par-
ents from making the best possible individualized risk-benefit deci-
sions for depressed children.  The efficacy issue goes to the possible 
benefit of a treatment, which in this case has never been proven to 
occur at a rate higher than placebo.304  The increase in suicidal 
thoughts goes to the risk to be considered, and so both sides of the 
equation as presented to the public were inaccurate.  The second 
problem is that without disclosure of the risks, even if a decision 
would have been made to go forward with the treatment, children 
would not be monitored for occurrences of the side effects that the 
research had revealed, making it more likely that occurrences of side 
effects would be under-reported and under-treated. 
This case study is particularly important here because the data 
about these drugs was derived through the use of volunteers, specifi-
cally, depressed children who became research subjects rather than 
simply receiving the care their personal physicians thought best.  All 
of the participants were suffering to a sufficient degree to be consid-
ered clinically depressed.305  These trials were primarily placebo-
there appears to be an increase [sic] frequency of reports of suicidally [sic] in the 
pediatric/adolescent patients exposed to sertraline compared to either placebo or 
sertraline-treated adult OCD [obsessive-compulsive disorder] patients.”)); see also id. 
at 58 (statement of Greg Walden, Vice Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations, citing Memorandum from Dr. Andrew Mosholder, Medical Officer, 
FDA, to Sulvay Pharmaceuticals (Dec. 13, 1996)) (regarding Luvoxamine maleate 
(Luvox), an SSRI, which stated that the incidence of agitation among the pediatric 
population taking this drug in the test was four times greater than that of the placebo 
group, and that “there is emerging literature pointing to behavioral reactions to SSRI 
drugs in children”). 
 303 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, People  v. Glaxosmithkline (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 
2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun2b_04_attach1. 
pdf. 
 304 E. Jane Garland, Facing the Evidence: Antidepressant Treatment in Children and Ado-
lescents, 17 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 489 (2004). 
 305 Careful subject selection can be important because it increases the coherency 
of a study, making the results more reliable.  However, it can also limit the usefulness 
of the information for the general population because the group in the trial is nar-
rowly defined.  In the case of antidepressants, the inclusion/exclusion criterion is 
very limiting, and results in the selection of a very small percentage of people who 
would actually present at their physician’s office complaining of depression.  See 
Mark Zimmerman et al., Are Subjects in Pharmacological Treatment Trials of Depression 
Representative of Patients in Routine Clinical Practice?, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 469, 469 
(2002). 
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controlled, meaning that a significant percentage of the subjects re-
ceived sugar pills.306
These studies involved at least two kinds of predictable risks for 
the children, both common in placebo trials.  The first was being 
placed in the placebo “arm” of the trial and not receiving the most 
effective treatment at the earliest possible time if the placebo arm of 
the trial proved to be less effective than the arm given the SSRI.  The 
second risk was the negative effects of the drugs themselves, a risk 
that in these trials materialized as a substantially increased incidence 
of suicidal ideations, meaning an increase in thoughts about suicide 
and an increase in actions taken to harm oneself. 
A number of studies conducted over the past fifteen years show 
SSRIs are no more effective in children and adolescents than a pla-
cebo, and present a substantial risk of suicidality.307  These studies 
were conducted on human subjects under the age of eighteen who 
were symptomatic with depression.308  Glaxo paid for many of these 
studies and other pharmaceutical companies funded the others.309  
The physicians who conducted these studies were bound by confiden-
tiality agreements with the manufacturers who sponsored them.310  
These agreements forbid the physicians to independently disclose 
any results of these studies.311
Dr. Andrew Mosholder, a child psychiatrist at the FDA, reviewed 
the clinical data about Paxil drug trials in pediatric populations and 
observed that some trial events reported under the column of clinical 
trial adverse events as “emotional liability” were actually severe 
enough to qualify as suicidal behavior or ideation.312  He then had the 
FDA request clarification from Glaxo as to these events, asking it to 
search its records using search terms the FDA generated that were 
more likely to reveal the more severe events.313  In March 2003, Glaxo 
gave Dr. Mosholder the data he requested and it showed an increase 
 306 See, e.g., Garland, supra note 304. 
 307 Id. at 489; see Gardiner Harris, Debate Resumes on the Safety of Depression’s Wonder 
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A1. 
 308 Garland, supra note 304, at 489. 
 309 See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 22 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder, 
Medical Officer, FDA). 
 310 Id. at 22. 
 311 See id. at 22; see also Harris, supra note 307. 
 312 House Hearings, supra note 292, at 22.  Adverse events in a clinical trial can 
mean a multitude of things and may or may not be connected to the drug or proce-
dure being tested.  It is not a simple task to deduce if an event is related to the trial 
or will prove to be statistically relevant.  Manipulating adverse event reporting can 
hide much that could prove relevant. 
 313 Id. 
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in suicidal thoughts and behaviors in those children taking Paxil com-
pared with those taking the placebo.314  In July 2003, the FDA asked 
the other manufacturers of SSRIs to analyze their data the same way 
Glaxo had, using FDA-derived search terms to check for adverse 
events that needed to be reported separately from the “emotional li-
ability” category.315  Dr. Mosholder analyzed all of the data in the fall 
of 2003, and subsequently prepared a report showing that these se-
vere adverse events were 1.9 times more likely to occur with the drugs 
than with placebos.316
Glaxo prepared the analysis that Dr. Mosholder requested in the 
spring of 2003 and sent it to the British agency, MHRA, in the sum-
mer of 2003 along with its application for a license.317  In effect, it was 
Dr. Mosholder’s analysis of Glaxo’s data that caused Glaxo to desig-
nate adverse events in a way that then prompted MHRA to issue its 
contraindication of SSRI use in pediatric populations.318  The FDA 
did nothing public with this analysis or data until it was leaked to the 
press in the United States in February of 2004 that Dr. Mosholder 
had assessed the increased risk of suicidality and the FDA was not do-
ing anything to address it.319  The FDA responded by starting a crimi-
nal investigation into who had leaked this confidential information 
about the drugs to the press.320
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 It has been shown that adverse events are poorly reported in most mental 
health trials. This problem is multi-determined, in that economic incentives for not 
disclosing the problems are combined with the difficulty of accurately describing 
events that can be difficult to objectively assess.  See Panagiotis N. Papanikoloau et al., 
Safety Reporting in Randomized Trials of Mental Health Interventions, 161 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1692, 1693–97 (2004) (giving statistics that support this assertion and 
calling for standardized reporting of these events).  The problem is not limited to 
mental health trials; the economic incentives to underreport problems are present in 
all areas of drug and device testing.  See, e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis & Joseph Lau, Com-
pleteness of Safety Reporting in Randomized Trials: An Evaluation of 7 Medical Areas, 285 
JAMA 437 (2001). 
 317 See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 23–26 (statement of Dr. Andrew 
Mosholder, Medical Officer, FDA). 
 318 There was a suspicion among some at the FDA that the drug companies had 
hidden the adverse events by “various inappropriate coding maneuvers.”  House Hear-
ings, supra note 292, at 135 (citing E-mail from Russell G. Katz to Dr. Andrew 
Mosholder, Medical Officer, FDA (June 3, 2003)). 
 319 See Goode, supra note 296. 
 320 The FDA’s focus was on protecting drug company safety and efficacy data from 
inadvertent disclosure, even when it was the FDA’s own analysis of that data that had 
been disclosed.  The investigation was ordered by Dr. Seligman of the FDA, who has 
justified his actions by stating that even though the information being leaked was not 
proprietary or a trade secret, it was “confidential” and should not have been released 
by the FDA.  See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 118 (statement of Dr. Paul Selig-
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One issue here was the statistical validity of the increased risk 
that the SSRI data presented.  Dr. Mosholder stated that the conclu-
sion he reached about the danger was much more convincing when 
he put the data from all of the different studies from the drug com-
panies together, giving him a larger data pool to analyze.321  When 
looking at the data from an individual study, “it is harder to have the 
same level of confidence that you have when you combine all the 
studies.”322
Dr. Mosholder was scheduled to present his research to an FDA 
advisory panel of experts concerning treatment for pediatric depres-
sion.323  This advisory panel would then make recommendations to 
the FDA.  The administration at the FDA did not let him present his 
conclusions, and this decision apparently led to the leak and to accu-
sations in the press of an attempt by the FDA to suppress his analy-
sis.324  The FDA claimed it was worried that presenting Mosholder’s 
analysis would be misleading to the public, and it would not let him 
present until further analysis of the issue occurred.325  The fear, oft 
repeated in hearings before Congress on this issue, was that people 
would stop prescribing the SSRIs for pediatric depression if faced 
with the data, and the administration wasn’t sure that was the best re-
sponse.326  The FDA has received a tremendous amount of criticism 
for its handling of the matter of children’s use of antidepressants.327  
man, FDA).  This does not create a clear justification for a criminal charge, but as 
will be discussed in more detail, it reveals the culture at the FDA regarding informa-
tion it has that could impact the profitability of drug companies. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. at 29.  The FDA had access to much of the data on SSRIs from the different 
companies that manufacture them, allowing Dr. Mosholder to perform this analysis 
on the large pool.  There are many drugs that share common properties or chemical 
structures and pooling of the data may reveal important statistical information. 
 323 House Hearings, supra note 292, at 29 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder, 
Medical Officer, FDA). 
 324 For more on Dr. Mosholder’s role in the SSRI problem with the FDA, see Greg 
Koski, FDA and the Life Sciences Industry: Business as Usual?, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
24–27 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between the FDA and drug companies). 
 325 House Hearings, supra note 292, at 29. 
 326 This fear is exactly the opposite of the ideal of informed consent.  The FDA 
appears to be functioning under a presumption that an incorrect and unsophisti-
cated risk-benefit analysis would be done by the advisory panel, and by physicians 
and parents, if given access to information it has not carefully edited.  The doctrine 
of informed consent encourages disclosure of the maximum amount of information 
possible in a comprehensible format, and places great faith in the appropriateness of 
the patient as the best decision maker. 
 327 See Laurel K. Leslie et al., The Food and Drug Administration’s Deliberations on An-
tidepressant Use in Pediatric Patients, 116 PEDIATRICS 195 (2005) (collected references 
much of this criticism). 
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Many feel that given its access to the bulk of this data over the last two 
decades, it should have been far more aggressive in issuing warnings 
and informing the medical and patient populations of the known 
risks.328  Recent congressional hearings and law review articles have 
examined this issue in detail,329 and a thorough examination of the 
propriety of the FDA’s role in the SSRI debacle is outside the scope of 
this Article.  What is clear is that the FDA is extremely cautious in 
how it responds to negative trial results.  To quote Dr. Robert Tem-
ple, director of the Office of Medical Policy at the FDA, “overall, 15 
studies in pediatric [depression] do not support the effectiveness of 
these drugs in pediatric populations.”330  However, he then says that 
to conclude based on these studies that the drugs do not work is 
premature.331
While it has not chosen to draw substantive conclusions from 
this failure to show efficacy, the FDA has been critical of drug com-
pany claims of efficacy in these studies.332  An internal FDA email writ-
ten by Dr. Mosholder about a study published in JAMA concerning 
the efficacy of Zoloft in a pediatric population, where the trial results 
 328 Id. 
 329 See, e.g., Sarah D. Gordon, Note, Antidepressants and Teen Suicide: An Analysis of 
the FDA’s Regulation of Pharmaceuticals for Use in Pediatric Patients, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 927 
(2005) (writing from the perspective of pediatric medicine, Gordon is highly critical 
of the FDA process as well as the handling of pediatric SSRI testing generally). 
 330 House Hearings, supra note 292, at 79 (statement of Robert Temple, FDA).  This 
number would include studies concerning Paxil and Zoloft that were published in 
medical journals as positive studies, i.e., studies that stated they had proven efficacy, 
but which failed to show efficacy under the FDA’s own analysis.  Id. 
 331 The FDA asked the drug companies to perform these tests on a pediatric popu-
lation under a system wherein the FDA can send a Written Request for a pediatric 
trial, which then triggers an additional six-month exclusivity of the drug being tested.  
Dr. Temple testified that because there was no requirement of a positive trial result 
to trigger the six-month exclusivity extension, he believed the drug companies were 
not properly motivated to design trials that would result in a positive finding.  Id.; see 
also Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  The Best Pharma-
ceuticals for Children Act reauthorized and expanded pediatric testing as initially 
presented in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.  See, e.g., 
Gregory Hazard, Please Sir, I Want Some More: Congress’ Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Pe-
diatric Testing Leaves Therapeutic Orphans Needing More Protection, 20 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 467 (discussing these acts and pediatric drug testing regulation in 
general).  Most strikingly, Dr. Temple’s testimony seems to imply that the drug com-
panies could design a study to generate a positive result if it was necessary for their 
exclusivity.  Given that a positive finding is supposed to be an objective measure of 
effectiveness, this is an extraordinary notion, one that exposes how open to manipu-
lation these trials might actually be and how acclimated to that manipulation the 
FDA has become. 
 332 See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 166 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder, 
Medical Officer, FDA). 
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had been previously submitted to the FDA and rejected as failing to 
prove efficacy, shows this: 
[W]e turned down this supplement[al application for drug ap-
proval] because each trial by itself failed.  This article combines 
the two trials to show a statistically significant effect.  I don’t see 
where they say the individual trials failed and they had to pool 
them to have a result.  Instead, the authors tout the combined 
analysis for having a large sample size . . . talk about spin!333
While the lack of public access to SSRI data was widespread, the 
criticism of Zoloft described above involved a published study, one 
that, however flawed, was presented to the public by being published 
in a medical journal.334  Glaxo submitted at least nine studies of SSRIs 
in a pediatric population to the FDA, and little of that data has ever 
been published.335  Dr. Graham Emslie was a researcher in four of 
these nine studies and stated that he believed the results were not 
published at least in part due to their negative results.  Dr. Emslie 
knew of at least six other trials for drugs similar to Paxil in a pediatric 
population that had also been completed but not published; in an in-
terview with the New York Times on this subject, Dr. Emslie would not 
disclose the names of the companies or drugs due to his being a party 
to confidentiality agreements regarding these studies.336
Nondisclosure contracts between investigators and sponsors are 
common, as are other clauses that can prevent investigators from in-
dependently examining the data they have helped collect or submit-
ting a manuscript for publication without sponsor approval.337  These 
contracts are not limited to the SSRI example.  The International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) recognized that these 
limitations could severely impair the objectivity of the articles re-
ceived by member journals and so in 2001 it began to require that au-
 333 Id.  This is further evidence of the problem being described here: the risk that 
when one entity has control of data it can exert control over how it is perceived, and 
is thus protected from challenges supported by other interpretations of the same in-
formation. Another example of this is Celebrex, a Cox-2 inhibitor.  Data published in 
the JAMA showed that it caused fewer side effects than two older arthritis drugs.  The 
results submitted turned out to be for the first six months of a twelve-month trial.  
The twelve-month trial data showed no advantage of Celebrex over the other drugs 
and the drug company had the full twelve months of data when it submitted the six 
month results to the journal.  ANGELL, supra note 2, at 109. 
 334 Karen D. Wagner et al., Efficacy of Sertraline in the Treatment of Children and Ado-
lescents with Major Depressive Disorder: Two Randomized Controlled Trials, 290 JAMA 1033 
(2003). 
 335 See House Hearings, supra note 292. 
 336 Harris, supra note 307. 
 337 Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agreements, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 
216, 216 (2005). 
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thors not be parties to these contracts, and not have the power to re-
view data, make publication decisions, or write their own articles.338  
These ICMJE requirements have simply not been complied with, as a 
detailed study of these journals has revealed.339  The professional and 
financial risks for researchers of failing to comply with the contracts 
with drug companies are grave, and few universities have the re-
sources to forego drug company funding.  Drug companies have 
been known to sue researchers for failing to comply with confidenti-
ality agreements, even with regard to safety concerns.340  A well-known 
example of this involved Dr. Nancy Olivieri at the University of To-
ronto.  Dr. Olivieri published an article expressing her concerns 
about the safety of a drug she had tested for the drug company Apo-
tex.  Subsequently, she was sued by Apotex, lost her position at the 
university, and ended up embroiled in a multi-year legal battle with 
both of those institutions.341  The university eventually adopted one of 
the stricter codes for limiting sponsor control of researchers. 
Dr. Jane Garland was another researcher involved in many of the 
studies of SSRIs for a pediatric population.  She has written that she 
too saw negative results of industry SSRI trials over the course of years 
but was also prohibited from disclosing them due to nondisclosure 
contracts she had with the sponsors.  In her article on this subject she 
describes in detail the numerous studies of these drugs that have 
 338 Id. 
 339 See Schulman et al., supra note 195. 
 340 There are examples of problems that motivated drug companies in the 1990s 
to insist on these highly controlling contracts.  See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Yoder, 
950 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  In Yoder, Dr. Yoder, a primary investigator for 
drug trials concerning Accutane, an acne drug that has been shown to cause suicidal-
ity in children, was unsuccessfully sued by Hoffman-La Roche for selling his research 
documents concerning Accutane under a theory that he had violated trade secret 
protections of the drug company.  Id.  The failure of a theory of trade secret protec-
tion to protect company interests probably contributed to the development of 
strongly-worded contract provisions protecting the sponsor’s interest in the data.  Id.  
In another incident, Immune Response, a drug company, sponsored a trial in a 
number of academic centers.  ANGELL, supra note 2, at 109–11.  In 1996, the lead in-
vestigators said the results were negative, meaning the trial had failed to prove what it 
set out to prove.  Id.  The drug company fought with the investigators over publish-
ing the results, filing suit in an attempt to stop them, but the suit failed.  Id. at 110.  
Immune Response apparently wanted to alter the wording of the publication to show 
a result in a small subset of the subjects in order to have a positive result to publish.  
Id.  The researchers said the result would not be scientifically valid.  Id.  The CEO of 
Immune Response justified its attempt to alter the results for publication by saying, 
“Just put yourself in my position.  I spent over $30 million.  I would think I have cer-
tain rights.”  Id. at 111. 
 341 See Laura Bonetta, Olivieri to Testify Against Apotex in Europe, 7 NATURE MED. 644, 
644 (2001). 
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failed to show efficacy and have shown an increase in suicidality 
risk.342  Dr. Garland also discusses some statistics that illuminate an-
other problem with SSRIs.  According to recent statistics, twenty per-
cent of children will suffer from an episode of major depressive dis-
order before turning eighteen.343  Modern medicine has no readily 
available treatment that has been widely accepted and proven effec-
tive for this illness.  The placebo effect of SSRI therapy is very high, 
meaning that forty to sixty percent of those given sugar pills show a 
statistically significant improvement.344  The SSRIs tend to have the 
same percentages of effectiveness as placebos, though with the two-
fold increased risk of suicidality over the placebo incidence.345  The 
obvious answer to this would be for doctors to simply prescribe the 
placebo, generating the statistical level of effectiveness with limited 
risks of side effects.  However, American physicians may not ethically 
prescribe placebos.346  The finding that SSRIs do nothing better than 
placebos, when you have a high placebo response rate, means that 
the SSRIs still perform better than doing nothing at all.  Physicians 
are left with two choices: (1) use the SSRI with serious risks of side ef-
fects in order to generate the effectiveness of the placebo; or (2) give 
the patient nothing and forego the 40 to 60 percent chance of the 
child finding relief.347  Given this quite real conundrum, the FDA may 
have felt itself to be in a far more complex problem than was readily 
apparent from the news coverage. 
In 1991, Eli Lilly (“Lilly”), the manufacturer of Prozac, was con-
fronted with concerns about the safety and efficacy of Prozac that 
were very similar to the ones more recently raised about Paxil and 
SSRIs in general.  Lilly defended Prozac to an FDA panel and con-
vinced this panel that Prozac did not cause an increased risk of sui-
 342 See Garland, supra note 304, at 489–91; see also David Healy, Lines of Evidence on 
the Risks of Suicide with Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 72 PSCHOTHERAPY & 
PYSCHOSOMATICS 71, 77 (2003) (analyzing the studies of adult populations and draw-
ing similar conclusions). 
 343 Garland, supra note 304, at 489. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
 346 For discussions of this complex question, see I. Klienman et al., Placebo Pain 
Medication: Ethical & Practical Considerations, 3 ARCH. FAM. MED. 453 (1994), and M.B. 
Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe with Care, 8 AM. J. LAW MED 371 (1982). 
 347 A letter to the editor of the American Journal of Psychiatry illustrates this di-
lemma, describing a shift from the “biopsychosocial” model to the “medical model of 
disease and intervention,” leaving physicians less inclined to offer any treatment that 
is not pharmaceutical.  Thus, the letter concludes that if the pharmaceutical inter-
vention is not efficacious, the psychiatrists are left saying, “Don’t take away the only 
thing we have to offer these kids.”  See Lawrence Diller, Letter, Antidepressants and 
Children’s Depression, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1226 (2005). 
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cidality or suicidal ideation in children and adolescents, which has 
now clearly been proven to occur.348  Participants of that panel have 
since stated that were they given access to the data recently made 
public, and at least some of which appears to have been known by 
Lilly at the time of the panel’s deliberations, it is likely that they 
would have voted against Prozac’s approval for use by children.349
Glaxo was sued by the State of New York in June of 2004 for fail-
ing to release accurate data about children’s reactions to antidepres-
sants.350  The complaint stated that Glaxo “engaged in repeated and 
persistent fraud by misrepresenting, concealing and otherwise failing 
to disclose to physicians information in its control concerning the 
safety and effectiveness of its antidepressant medication . . . in treat-
ing children and adolescents with Major Depressive Disorder.”351  The 
complaint further alleged that Glaxo allowed positive information 
about pediatric use of SSRIs to be disclosed but withheld and con-
cealed related negative information.352  The complaint went into 
great detail about documents used by Glaxo as part of a deceptive 
marketing campaign and about internal emails regarding negative 
studies.353  The disclosed documents do much to illuminate a culture 
where data is merely one element among many of a business to be 
managed, rather than something with independent scientific merit 
that is judged solely by its accuracy.  Glaxo quickly settled this law-
suit,354 but not before these internal documents were made public.  
 348 See Harris, supra note 307.  
 349 See id.  It appears that Lilly suppressed data from the 1980s that showed a sub-
stantial risk of self-harm and violence to others in adults taking Prozac, failed to pro-
vide the data to the FDA, and did not provide it in response to discovery requests in a 
subsequent lawsuit from 1989.  See Jeanne Lenzer, FDA to Review “Missing” Drug Com-
pany Documents, 330 BRIT. J. MED 7, 7 (2005).  Furthermore, Lilly had been given sub-
stantial post-marketing data from physicians reporting adverse events, but the drug 
company edited the data before presenting it to the FDA, excluding seventy-six of 
ninety-seven cases of reported suicidality among patients who had been prescribed 
Prozac, according to an FDA memorandum dated September 11, 1990.  Id. 
 350 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, People  v. Glaxosmithkline (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 
2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun2b_04_attach1. 
pdf. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. at 2. 
 353 Id. passim. 
 354 Settlement was reached on August 26, 2004.  See Press Release, Office of the 
New York State Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo, Leading Pharmaceutical Com-
pany Settles Suit Alleging Pricing Scheme for Cancer Patient Medications and other 
Drugs: Settlements Will Yield Millions for Government Health Plans and Consumers 
(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/aug/aug10a_06. 
html; see also Brooke A. Masters, Paxil Maker Will Post Its Unfavorable Test Results, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at E1. 
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The crux of the internal documents showed that as early as 1998 
Glaxo, recognizing that its sponsored studies on Paxil were generat-
ing problematic data about Paxil’s safety and efficacy in a pediatric 
population, hoped to “manage the dissemination of data in order to 
minimize any potential negative commercial impact.”355  According to 
an internal document from Glaxo written for the purpose of manag-
ing the data from these trials, “[i]t would be commercially unaccept-
able to include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated” 
even though efficacy had, in fact, not been established.356  According 
to the State of New York’s complaint, the management of these data 
for this purpose appears to have extended to the content of practi-
tioner letters and the promotional materials used by drug company 
sales staff.357
In response to the leaks to the press, the heightened concerns of 
the public, congressional hearings and, likely, a multitude of other 
reasons, the FDA eventually mandated that a black box warning be 
placed on all SSRIs prescribed in this country.358  A black box warning 
is the strongest type of warning that can be put on a label.359  It con-
sists of bold letters surrounded by a thick black border.360  The SSRI 
warning says, in relevant part: 
 355 See Masters, supra note 354. 
 356 See Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company Experts Advised Staff to 
Withhold Data About SSRI Use in Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N.  J. 783, 783 (2004). 
 357 Practitioner letters are letters sent by drug companies to physicians that inform 
them of information about the drugs they are prescribing.  The promotional materi-
als are ones handed to the doctors by the direct sales representatives of the drug 
companies.  A surprising amount of physician education about new treatments oc-
curs through non-medical sales representatives of the drug companies.  For a de-
tailed discussion about the difficulty in separating pharmaceutical education from 
promotion, see Carl Elliot, Pharma Goes to the Laundry: Public Relations and the Business 
of Medical Education, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18, 18–23 (2004). 
 358 See FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION GUIDE: ABOUT USING ANTIDEPRESSANTS IN 
CHILDREN OR TEENAGERS, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIMedi 
cationGuide.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION 
GUIDE], for information regarding antidepressants in children and teenagers in Oc-
tober 2004.  Interestingly, this guide, meant for parents and children, states that 
“[t]here are Benefits and Risks When Using Antidepressants,” a statement about the 
benefit of the drugs which is highly disputed.  Id. 
 359 FDA Labeling Change Request Letter, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/anti 
depressants/SSRILabelChange.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter FDA La-
beling Change Letter].  In real numbers, if ten million children a year are prescribed 
these drugs in this country, that means two hundred thousand of them will predicta-
bly suffer from suicidality with no counter-balancing proven usefulness of the drug 
the children are taking.  In addition, the studies have all been short-term, which 
means that risks of long-term use, both physical side effects on children’s developing 
bodies and future psychiatric problems, have not been studied. 
 360 See FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION GUIDE, supra note 358. 
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Pooled analyses of short-term (4 to 16 weeks) placebo-controlled 
trials of nine antidepressant drugs (SSRIs and others) in children 
and adolescents with MDD, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
or other psychiatric disorders (a total of 24 trials involving over 
4400 patients) have revealed a greater risk of adverse events rep-
resenting suicidal thinking or behavior (suicidality) during the 
first few months of treatment in those receiving antidepressants.  
The average risk of such events on drug was 4 percent, twice the 
placebo risk of 2 percent. No suicides occurred in these trials.361
What happened with children’s antidepressants has become a 
quick way of referring to a complex set of problems.  The main point 
for purposes of this Article’s thesis is that drug companies do, in fact, 
suppress and manipulate data that is derived from the use of human 
research subjects.  That which is learned, but not shared, from the 
subject’s sacrifices can easily be used to mislead scientists, physicians 
and the public, clouding rather than clarifying, which entirely con-
founds the purpose behind the sacrifice being made by the subject. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A disservice has been done to millions of people: the positive ef-
fects of their very real and measurable sacrifices as research subjects 
have been unconscionably minimized.  Congress’s initial legislative 
goal leading to the development of the Belmont Report has been 
substantially thwarted.  Those who regulate these undertakings have 
failed to instill the discipline necessary to ensure that their own regu-
latory requirements are fulfilled.  Much of the research sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies that is conducted on human beings is 
deeply flawed because it fails to satisfy a foundational element of 
properly conducted research on human beings: it must be calculated 
to generate a benefit for society.  The failure to recognize the neces-
sary legal implications of benefit to society in research has led to the 
creation of regulatory inconsistencies and incoherencies on multiple 
levels between the structure that regulates research on human sub-
jects362 and that which regulates the pharmaceutical industry as an 
industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry recognizes the financial value of 
the information it collects from the use of human research subjects.  
The desire to create financial incentives for the development of new 
treatments and cures makes perfect sense, springing from our fear of 
 361 FDA Labeling Change Letter, supra note 359. 
 362 This structure is meant to include the Belmont Report and the Common Rule.  
See Belmont Report, supra note 8. 
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illness, our desire to save loved ones from pain and suffering, and a 
belief that by offering an industry large profits it will be encouraged. 
As stated in Part II, as much as we desperately fear illness, and 
just as desperately as we need human subjects to experiment on in 
our search for cures, we have no legal or normative right to use peo-
ple in this manner.  This use requires a difficult philosophical analysis 
and justification.  The normative challenge inherent in the project of 
conducting research on human subjects is not susceptible to simple 
or easy answers.  The possibility of conflict with other societal desires 
is unavoidable because of the very nature of the undertaking.  In an 
attempt to create a system for the use of human subjects that is nor-
matively defensible, Congress directed the Commission to prepare 
the Belmont Report, and this report has become law.  If the princi-
ples in the Belmont Report have any meaning, the societal benefit 
derived from the use of human research subjects has to be protected 
far more vigorously than has been done in recent years.  The fact that 
this may have negative financial implications for the industry is not a 
legal or philosophically valid ground for continuing to maintain the 
status quo. 
Pharmaceutical companies have routinely claimed that there 
may be significant negative health implications for our population if 
we fail to protect the financial incentives for drug companies that are 
created by giving them full control over this type of data, due to a re-
duction in drug company research and development.  Even if this is 
entirely correct, it does not function as an excuse for failure to be-
have properly in this context.  If possible, a rethinking of the incen-
tive structure should be contemplated in order to protect the positive 
effect of incentives while ending the negative implications for human 
research subjects, but that is not a necessary corollary to the reform 
that is called for here. 
As was shown in Part II, the requirement of a benefit to society, 
to humankind, from a specific research endeavor, is not subject to 
balancing against a different good or benefit, including one that is 
produced through the machinations of the pharmaceutical industry.  
This type of balancing is inapplicable to the analysis that must take 
place in assessing the potential benefit of an experiment.  To put it 
another way, potential research subjects reside in a room with one 
locked door that leads into it.  In order to open that door, the re-
searcher must comply with the principles embodied in the Belmont 
Report.  Entering the room is a privilege, not a right, and the regula-
tions are meant to protect the integrity of the undertaking, not to ef-
fectuate an efficient access to subjects.  Viewed that way, the pharma-
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ceutical companies’ suppression and manipulation of the data they 
control should function to prevent the industry from unlocking that 
door. 
There are a number of specific steps that can be taken as part of 
reinvigorating the concept of benefit in research.  HHS can propose 
regulations that would enable IRBs to demand specific plans from re-
searchers as to dissemination of data and analysis likely to be gener-
ated by the study under review.  The FDA can publicly reexamine its 
stance as regards protection of safety and efficacy data from FOIA re-
quests, given the unintended consequence this has had of further iso-
lating data that could, if released, promote a greater beneficial out-
come from a research project.  With the regulations that are currently 
in effect, some change in enforcement is clearly necessary. 
What this Article hopes to provoke with its analysis is an in-
formed examination of our presumptions regarding the role of bene-
fit in research on human subjects, with the different participants ex-
amining their current role and motivation in the scientific endeavors 
they participate in.  We have a model for this in the critical examina-
tion we gave to the principle of autonomy that occurred around the 
time that the Belmont Report was being drafted, and which resulted 
in a far more vigorous approach to informed consent in research and 
in the private physician-patient relationship.  That examination 
caused enormous upheaval in many of the relationships that make up 
the research enterprise.  A similar shift is necessary for the concept of 
benefit to have a meaning beyond platitude. 
